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The author of a pioneer book dealing with Latin
American ainaed forces, written only two years ago, remarked
on the scarcity of earlier writir this subject. He
could make a similar observation concerning the period since
his book appeared. The result has been that discussion of
this important subject has expressed principally a single
point of view, one which finds little eaerit in either the
Latin American artaed forces or the U.S. military assistance
programs . In presenting an alternative view, derived to
some extent from the sources but with a different
emphasis placea on the informtion, I hope to widen the range
of judgments on w; s who are interested in the sub-
ject siay draw In BftkSng their own assessments.
My views are no doubt influenced by my twenty-two
years of service, both in the an enlisted man and in
the Havy as an officer, but my opinions have no official
status and may not be widely shared by military personnel.
I consider my outlook to be one of sympathy with the rationale
of U.S. military assistance efforts and with the thinking of
military men in our own and other countries, but not of bias
toward either.
The most modest effort benefits from generous encour-
agement, and I cannot adequately express appreciation to
ill

av&ryone who haa given gae Incentive to pursue this study.
However, special thanks are due to Frofesaor Anther^
Sokol, who devoted ao tauch of his time and experience to
the arduous task of pointing out the spots in the
work as it progressed and indicating how they could be
smoothed out. To the extent that I have been faithful to
his guidance, the study has gained clarity and lost some
cluaisiness. Professor John J. Johnson also has my gratitude
for giving urn more inspiration than he amy have realised.
The U.S. Havy deserves expression here of the appreciation I
have 1c I id deeply felt for the ©any rewarding opportunities
with which 1 have been favored,, and which aire exemplified in
the assigrmsem ;. -• wA ^d studies
possible.
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Ai&fig the most noticeable characteristic* of the post-
warId War II period have been the immensity and the coat of
world-wide military preparedness measures. The United States
is engaged in speeding the process throughout the free world
order to counter adverse changes in the world power situa-
tion. Mo*t of the polf preliminaries already have been
completed, the alliances I -X the oper
.
bodies
established, *hat renjaina is the cantIn . process of
supplylug equipment to .... alios who naed it and.
training their mtm to use it, principally through military
missions a.n& adviao -roups. Ihla . /ity has proceeded
at an uneven pace, but acceleration has been more character-
istic o^ it than slackening has been. Both the scope of
U.S. military assistance efforts and the stakes involved
indicate the importance of this field and the desirability
of further study of it.
America commands more attention now than it did
in earlier years, and discussion of military cooperation
between that area and the United States, always important to
some observers of military events, might now attract even
more widespread interest.
True, the military threat to Latin America has seemed
less clear and urgent than the dangers existing in other
1

areas. Consequently the underlying reason* for adopting and
>,lfying military assistance to Latin America sometimes
undergo extensive revision with changed situa-
tions. Som arguments are dropped as their applicability
diminishes, only to be resurrected as new influences make
them relevant once more. Others emerge fron t ..-and
to become determinants. Recently reintroduced as i spelling
reason in favor or military assistance to Latin fcaerlcan
countries, for instance, is the problem Of their internal
security. This, and other premises for continuation of U.
aid to Latin *mer. ^re discussed In subsequent chapters.
Not only have w tditions changed, but the
the . .. military leaders have altered, b^
revisl i tlon of \K3. armed t k. Increased
capabilities in terms a al weapons And guerrilla
warfare are the most recent manifest. ;s. The principal
causes fesr ilitary thought are the rapid
teelmolo&iasJ .nee in weapons systems and the frequent
occurrence of Indigenous, but Communist inspired, guerrilla
warfare in the world. $ew equipment may be slow to get
latin American arsaed forces from U.S. sources, but new ideas
and the organisation and tactics based on them are certain
to be transmitted rather rapidly. The military forces of
Latin America have experienced considerable improvement as a
result of their own efforts and U.S. help, and they are able
to adopt and apply new military techniques readily.
Improvements in the armed forces need not be confined
to military capabilities, nor need the forces be Influential

only in martial matters, Modern i fcary strength requires
a sound economic basis, raasonabl. industrial capacity,
supply facilities* , mobility, and trailed personnel. These
are actually the needs or all under,. .:<ped countries them-
selves, distinct from their ansaed forces. Efforts to meet
these requirements of the milit i 'orea* further progress in
national development, provided a reasonable I. tan
civilian and ary needs is maintained. In this study,
an attempt is made to indicate some of the military contribu-
tions to national growth and to evaluate the proportion of
effort devoted to military ends.
International growti vary important too, especial
now when so many new nations > often beset by serious problems,
are eraer Id peace requires that all nations progress
in rtabill r>d prosper! rata to help
those countries wi I -,re having difficulty i . transi-
tion. The American republics furnish a model for peace:
settlement of disputes and for joint action t rgan-
isation of American States, As members of the Unite- I ions,
they should be able to share the procedures and continue the
cooperation the;, have developed in the 0A3. Though the func-
tions of these two organisations cover a wide rang© of politi-
cal, social, and economic efforts, this study is chiefly con-
cerned with the military i rt available to these organiza-
tions.
Many questions have been raised concerning the assump-
tions and interpretations which are the basis for \J,S, mili-
tary policy toward Latin America, as well as the effects of

the assistance programs and the extent to which their objec-
tives are being attained. These questions are susceptible
of different answers, and those presented here are so®etia»es




HSMisFHiiftic smwxmt WkCiam&®® jlopm£nt
oallitary assistance program *or Latin aaeri-
ui to have **«&au ,. 09 only after paa-
I Mutual 'Xt el *, which expanueu the
I aet ^ providing anus to NATO countries.
.-ehensibie, however, the story taust began siueh earlier
— in ttu . . Ul confined to Europe.
It was tnen v... bates alone displaced
.uropesan Qeriaany, I had
been c .• advis* • armec. forces of
iericaJR nations. It was then, too, that coaHait«ents
were i . aeriean equipment and f&ellltle* to
.tex'ica, though redemption of the promises hac to await
tit in the war ana agreesients on lend-lease
pacts. These e&rlj uiisaiona ana the oateraal support given
at that tia>e pro 3 the rationale ana precedents far the
subsequent renewal oi these efforts under the revised Mutual
oecuriv .. the increase ifi the capabilities ana equip-
ment level of Latin hi lerlean urtaed forces curing world War II
was the foundatlofi for i*sple?aentati. the ;ut. k brief
aescription of the wartime provisions £or hemispheric secu-
rity ana later steps to rebuild ana improve the defensive
posture is furnished as a basis for aore detailed examination
5

6of the influence of U.S. military programs In Latin America.
Prewar Military Missions and Attached
The use of foreign Military training missions had
begun early and was fairly extensive in Latin America. Chile
was receiving the services of a German mission in 1885, and
General Koemer, who led it, later became chief of the
Chilean general staff* He carried out a comprehensive pro-
gram of renovation of the Chilean army. In 1899 a German
mission was performing similar work in Argentina, Chile
passed on her knowledge to Colombia, Venezuela* Paraguay,
and El Salvador by sending them missions and to Ecuador and
Nicaragua by receiving their officer students in her military
schools. French missions were employed in Brazil, Ecuador,
Peru, and Guatemala. Though the circumstances differed
vastly, the United States trained armed forces in the coun-
tries she occupied in the early 1900's. These included




It was the State Department which, in early 1^33,
initiated the move to increase U.S. military assistance to
Latin America. The Department had become alarmed over the
increasing activity of Nazis and Fascists in this area and
it proposed Increases in U.S. activity through visits by
U.S. ships and aircraft, visits by high-ranking Latin
American officers to the U.S., school training in the U.S.
1. Kdwin Lieuwen, A,rma and Politics in Latin America
(New York: Frederick tl i^raeger, Tnc.,l96c), pp. 32-33.

for Junior officers, providing At nd Navy publications to
military libraries in Latin i\m ., and the assignment of
more military attaches to latin America, at the time, the
U.S. army had only six attaches and two small missions in
the twenty Latin American republics. The Navy had maintained
missions in Brazil since 1918 and Peru since 1920.3 The
recommendations of the State Department were carried out,
though a shortage of qualified officers caused the increase
in the number of attaches to proceed slowly. By December
1941, however, the Army was represented by attaches or
missions in all of the Latin American capitals. All Axis
missions had been eliminated by this time.^
Wartime arms Supply to Latin America
In , the combined numerical strength of the
Live military forces of Latin America exceeded considerably
that of the United States. However, tie two groups were not
of comparable quality, and the countries of the hemisphere,
with the help of the United States, strove to upgrade the
Latin American armed forces. The principal thought at first
was the defense of the Americas, especially the protection
of the Panama Canal and the preclusion of an enemy assault
on the hump of Brazil from africa, 1800 miles away. It was
evident that only the United States could effectively counter
2. Stetson Conn and Byron Fairchlld, The Western Hemisphere
,
?**£. Framework of Hemisphere Defense, Vol. XXI of 'United
States army in
"
"^brId War TT (Washington, I). C:
government Print In- QOTce, i960), p. 173.
3. Lleuwen, p. 188.
4. Conn and Fairchild* pp. 27^ and 185.
5. Lleuwen, p. 191.
6. Conn and Fairchild, p. 416.

invasion of northeastern Brazil, but the „lllan Array
wanted to improve its own ground forces so that they could
defend the bulge area without American ground assistance .'
By earl;, 1942 it was agreed the U.3. ground combat forces
could be stationed there provided enough military equipment
were delivered to permit Brazilian and American troops to
provide joint defense on an equal footing.
Because of her strategic importance Brazil received
about three-fourths of all the lend-lease aid c;iven to
Latin America durii id after the war.^ Mexico received
more than ten percent of the total lend-lease deliveries,
since her proximity to the United States allowed her to
sake important contributions of radar sites and airfields
and made her security from subversion imperative. ** The
portion of lend-lease assistance given to other Latin
American countries was thus quite small.
Kust of the lend-lease assistance was furnished in
the form of airfield construction and planes. Much was for
major equipment such as coast artillery ^uns, light tanks,
and trucks. Very little was for personal arms—-rifles,
pistols or machine gun*. There was a need for small arms,
however. An early request by Mexico was for 50*060 rifles,
among other things, but it was turned down because legisla-
tion at that time did not permit the sale of the items she
7. Conn and Pairchlld, p. 26?.
Conn and Fairchild, p* 314.
9. Conn and Fairchild, p. 329.
10. Conn and Fairchild, p. 353.

requested. 11 Brazil sent 700C of her own rifles to the
Uruguayan Army in 194c when a Nazi plot was uncovered in
Uruguay. 12 In 1942 a guard force of ninety Brazilians at
Natal airfield had only fifteen pistols. *3 General Marshall
thought that it should be U.S. policy not to sell small arms,
but a contrary policy decision was made by accident when
President Roosevelt promised to furnish rifles and machine
guns in a conversation with the President of Haiti. Many
similar requests and needs were filled later as U.S. produc-
tion permitted.
There were many other needs, of course. U.S. liaison
officers who toured South American countries in 1940 found
them lacking in even the essentials of self-defense, needing
airfields, planes, patrol craft, artillery, and even efficient
intelligence services. 1^ The Chilean military establishment
was notoriously weak by this time, and the large German ele-
ment in the country was cause for concern. 1^ No nation in
Latin America was considered capable of making a major mili-
tary contribution to the common defense. A ' Brazil, the de-
fense of whose northeastern bulge was considered so important,
was ill prepared militarily for its size and wealth. The Navy
was antiquated. The Army strength was 66,000 men, but it
lacked modern equipment, and it was concentrated in the south.
11. Conn and Fairchild, p. 353.
12. Conn and Fairchild, p. 274.
13. Conn and Fairchild, p. 321.
14. Conn and Fairchild, p.
15. William L. longer and 3. iiverett Gleason, The Challenge to
Isolation , 1937-1940 (New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers,
1>52), p. 6177"
16. Linger and Gleason, p. 27o.
17. Lieuwen, p.

The Air Force was weaker than that of either .-j.ntina or
Peru. Lack of industrial capac. jade Brazil dependent on
sources abroad for arms.
The United otates could do little to supply deficien-
cies. In the prewar period, the laws did not permit the
sale of any bat obsolete and surplus material. Latin American
countries did not want this equipment, and those which accepted
some of it had problems with assembly, with spare parts, and with
aawunition supplies. Besides, in 2 he U. 3 too hard
pressed to equip its own expanding forces and meet its commit-
ments to Great Britain to be able to provide even token ship-
ments of modern arms to Latin America. Passage of the Lend-
Lease Act in ftarch 19^2 ended legal limitations, but pearl
Harbor upset all plans and schedules for 1yk2 delivery of arms
to Latin America, and regular deliveries were not possible
until the spring of 1S>43. 15
By that time it was evident that invasion of the hemi-
sphere was no longer a poasibilit Therefore the question
was raised as to whether or not it was desirable to continue
to supply Latin America with arms, as had been planned. The
share ^iven to some states was beginning to arouse Jealousy
and distrust in others, as had been foreseen in 1941.
revised policy was adopted, under which arms continued to be
provided but for purposes which differed in scope from those
of earlier policies. Material was now furnished only for
anti-submarine operations, overseas offensive operations.
Conn and Fairchlid, pp. 266-267.
19. Conn and fairchild, pp. 211-235.

11
maintenance ^nd repair of existing equipment, and the preserva-
tion of internal stability. The effect was to reduce lend-
lease aid to the greatest possible extent ,^€
a change of policy leading to reduction of aid was in
line with the basic philosophy of lend-lease aid to Latin
America. Partly in recognition of postwar problems of restor-
ing law and order, and partly in fear of possible control by
subversive or Axis elements, the policy established in 1941
withheld offensive armaments from the Latin American arms
program. In this category were heavy and medium bombardment
aircraft, bombs heavier than 300 pounds, medium &n& heavy
tanks, chemical warfare agents, artillery above six inch
caliber, combat ships, torpedo boats, and similar equipment.
when a border dispute between Peru and Ecuador erupted into
hostilities in *$&*« delivery of weapons of any kind to
these two countries was suspended until the dispute was
settled.21
>ther significant items should be mentioned briefly
in connection with arms supply to Latin America. The United
States was instrumental in getting German arms into Brazil
at a time when supply by the U.3. was impossible. Brazil
had or^&re6 artillery from Germany on a barter basis before
the war. Only part of the equipment was delivered by the
time war broke out. Later, as a result of U.S. persuasion,
the British allowed an American ship to load some missing
20, Conn and Fairchiid, pp^ 235-236,
21. Conn and Fairchiid, p. 2.

parts which had bmn interned In Lisbon for delivery to Brazil
,
smtuzr Vj4l .Brazil obtained two hundred guns from
Germany, though lack of parts mde some of these unusable.^2
After lend-lease arrangements were rnde, supply of u.
,
equipment to Latin America was considerable, but the Latin
American snare was only one percent of the total expenditures
by tne U.^S. in this program Argentina received no arias
froos the U.S. because of her reluctance to cooperate in hemi-
sphere defense saeasures. No rmv^rse lend-lease was requested
of the Latin American countries, since their govemisents
could not finance such aid, nor did the localities in which




Most of the countries of Latin Asterica were anxious
to contribute to offensive operations against the Axis as
well as to the defensive effort in the hemisphere. However,
in none of these countries could forces be equipped and
trained quickly enough and completely enough to for® an
effective coiabat contingent of sufficient strength. Brazil
oade the largest contribution of cosb&t forces, as night be
expected of the recipient of so large a share of U.S. assist-
ance, still, Brazil had been so weak that the Brazilian
krmy had objected to severance of diplomatic relations with
the hxIs in 19*2 because it feared this step might lead to a
. Conn and Fairchilc, p. 271.
Conn and Falrchild, pp. £30-237.

vi&i ch it was in no condition to resident Var
aid sever relations, however , and soon afterwards Brasil
wanted to take an active part in the war. The U.S. .Depart
-
cnent or 3tate urged the sending of a Brazilian battalion to
North Africa, but the U.S. Array declined on the grounds that
this . sake it necessary to send troops >ther Latin
Asoerican nations too, and that none were ready. By 1944#
however, Brazil was able to send twenty-five thousand ground
troops and an air squadron tc the Italian theater, where
they acquitted themselves well. Mexico also sent a small
force to combat. The 201st Fighter squadron In
Luaon, Philippine Islands, after training in the United
States in 1944*** That only these two countries could send
cosibat forces abroad, and do so relatively late in the
fighting, is an indication of the difficulties involved in
readi he armed forces of willing nations, not a mani-
festation of unwillingness to cooperate in the war effort.
All of the Latin American countries except Argentina
led to the extent that their endowments permitted
-t use could be ©ade of thea, though most of these
. ..ild a&ke little or no contribution without help
frofii tl ited States. Sixteen of the Latin American i
tions permitted development of naval and air bases in their
territory that were available to the United states for
regular or emergency use during the war. Ferr$ ft
24, Conn and Fairehild, pp. 313-329.




to theaters of war would have oe«n impossible without them,
ami ocean patrols would have been much more difficult. All
of Latin America rendered economic aid of great value to
the war effort of the United Nations. A. less spectacular,
and perhaps less vital, effort was the political cooperation
of Latin American countries in the Pan-American Conferences
and in the Inter-*®erlcan Defense Board, with resultant
harmony and coordination, Some of the wartime declarations
and policies have had far-reaching and continuing results.
A major contribution by latin American countries was
the control of elements of their societies which could have
posed a serious threat to hemispheric security through
subversion. £1 initiation of foreign missions has already
been mentioned, but foreign influence remained. Certain
Latin American Governments were afraid that their large
German, Italian, and Japanese settlements contained trained
Fifth Columns ready to align the continent with the Axis.
These fears were not unfounded. The Nasi government made a
strong effort to exert influence over Germans abroad ever
since it came to power in Germany, and there wex»e no less than
native Germans and 1,8 persons of German de-
scent in latin America toward whom influence was directed.
Propaganda from Nazi embassies and pressure from German
businessmen were present in all countries of Latin America. 2^
In a few of them, actual plots and attempts at insurrection were
26. Conn and Fairchild, p. 237.
27. Langer and Gleason, pp, 607-614.
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^covered, such as those in Argent ile In the
sumser of In any event, one of the major aims of
the United states was the buildup of latin American forces
to fee strong enough to insure internal order, and much of
the arsns supply program was tailored to meet this goal.
une possible avenue for subversive activity and
sabotage that was particularly worrisome was the extensive
operation of airlines by forei ..tionals in Latin America.
Colombia was an especially sensitive area in this respect.
The United States ultimately gained control of these air-
lines through the manipulations of the Fan -American nirways
Company, acting as agent for the U.S. government, with the
cooperation of the Latin American governments. The forei-
airlines were suspected of reconnaisance for Axis submarines
and guidance of Axis »h.lppin& past British blockade ships,
since an increased tempo of operations of the airlines coin-
cided with increased activity by the Axis ships. The
possibility ot a more or less personal raid on the Panama
Canal by one or more of the youn& German pilots was consid-
ered a serious threat. There can be no doubt that German
pilots sained familiarity with Latin Ataerica, that the air-
fields owned ^ foreign lines could have been useful to an
invading force, and that contact with Axis diplomats and
agents was maintained through the airlines. Elimination of
foreign aviation interests removed an actual threat, and
a much greater potential threat, to hemispheric security.
28, Langer and Gleason, p.
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Pan-American Airways went on to construct or enlarge many
air facilities in Latin America In cooperation with the
several governments there.
A rather unusual feature of inter-American relations
before and during World afar II was President Roosevelt's
reluctance to make firm commitments for bases in the Carib-
bean area for U.S. use. In 1936 he had evolved the idea of
Pan-American sovereignty or trusteeship over Caribbean
islands beloz ropeun powers. This idea was reinforced
by the view that for the United states to acquire any of these
Islands, by whatever means, would conflict with American
policy of not seeking territorial expansion and would result
in unfavorable world opinion. The President felt secure in
this position because he was certain that in the event of
war, the latin American Republics would be on the side of
the United States in common defense, 30 that there was no
need to acquire or lease facilities in peace time. The
President was opposed to transfers of sovereignty over
European colonies in the New World to any nor. -American power,
and the State Department published a memorandum to this
effect.-* The Havana Conference of foreign ministers of
American states had given sanction to President Roosevelt's
trusteeship idea in July 1940 by passage of the Act of Havana,
2j. Conn and Fairchlld, pp. 23&-259. The story of Fan-Ameri-
can Airways 1 efforts is a rather involved one, but It Is
presented very lucidly in this source.
30. Langer and Oleaaon, pp. 622-625.

tded for inter•&m*ri itratioi European
jess ions should It become necessary to > them over in
order to prevent the Axis fro© getting control of them. 3*
However, base rights were acquired unilaterally aoon
afterward when Great Britain gave the United States altea in
itiah possessions in return for destroyers and other arma.
The United States military forces were somewhat indifferent
concerning theae acquisitions and conaidered them little
more than an expedient to make the transfer of destroyers
acceptable to America, These basaa ware made available to
all American Republics, in keeping with the Havana agreement,
when the United States circulated a note to that effect
all the Latin American governments .
3
s Although the destroyer
«
base arrangement reduced the need for bases in Latin American
countries and possessions, the United States did ultimately
acquire some. fcarly plans called for U.S. use of facilltiea
•only when a Latin American state specifically asked for the
assistance of Unite i States forces. 33 «me Latin American
otriea were wary of stationing U.S. troops on their terri-
tory aa security forces or airplane mechanics, t they
did not object to use of airfields by military aircraft, nor
the use of specified porta by naval veaaels. The U.o. waa
equally wary of putting troops in civilian clothes at varioua
installations, as Brazil, Hexico, and Venezuela proposed.
However, small U.S. Marine security companies were allowed
31. Conn and Fairchild, p. 4 .
32. Conn and Fairchild, pp. 51-62.
33. Conn and Fairchild, p. 191.

at Belem, Natal, ami Heclfe within two weeks of the attack
on Pearl Harbor, after considerable negotiation at h.
levels. U.S. Forces in Brazil were gradually augmented
after this time .3^ Mexico was equally reluctant to allow the
use of airfields as operating bases until after she formally
entered the war in May 1942, and it took almost another year
to reach an agreement that permitted U.S. troopa to be stationed
at these installations in small numbers and under restrictive
conditions. 33
'fne Mutual security Act
Many of the consideration* which were associated with
World fear 11 program* of military supply and cooperation
between the United states and Latin America have reappearea
in the application of the Mutual security act to tne western
hemisphere. The act was initlatea in 19% as a means of
providing arms to KATO stesioera in oraer that Communism mignt
be contained. The Korean police action, and the Inability
of some mecobers of tne united Nations to respona to tne U.N.
Security Council's request for aid in stoppmc , hostilities,
caused tie U.S. to expand tne scope of the -ict, to extend
its operation to Latin America.
A sizable amount ot: military equipment nad been fur-
nlsned to Latin America under the terms oV the Lend-Lease
Act during world War II. However, with the termination of
this program, the equipment deteriorated for lack o^ spare
34. Conn and Fairchiid, pp. 303-306,
35. Conn and Fairchiid, pp. 3^6-3
•
parts &n& m a Latin American countries were
tilling to spend t --nmy required to keep
their 0« - ;pplled arms in optimum operating condition. In
some instances they preferred to buy new arms from European
suppliers instead. In 19%5 the Inter-American Defense Board
had recommended standardisation of arms., in part so that the
supply of spare parts and ammunition would not be cut off by
hostilities outside the hemisphere, and the desirability of
such a program was generally recognised. It was imperiled,
however, by the inability of Latin American nations to
continue to purchase the requisite materials in the United
States. Efforts by the Truman administration to get Congrea*
sional action on bills to continue inter-American military
assistance by supplying, equipment had failed in 1946 and
1947.36
% 1947* the economic plight of Europe, and the possi-
bility of Communist exploitation of this condition, gave rise
to the Marshall Plan for systematic reconstruction on a
regional scale. Economic recovery and rising standards of
living were assumed to be an effective device to counter
local subversion arising from internal Communist penetration.
However, a series of Soviet maneuvers, starting with Russian
refusal to Join the Marshall Flan, and including conflict
in Greece and Turkey, the take-over of Czechoslovakia, the
expulsion of Yugoslavia from the Communist bloc, and the
Berlin bloeKade, made Europe anxious about direct Soviet
36, Lieuwen, pp. 1

. i id the f military means t< *ose it* In
United States took the lead In establishing the
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, which tied military
assistance to a defensive alliance of Atlantic nations*
th»: ti*ne that the North Lantlc Treaty was ratified,
the Mutual Defense Assistance Act was proposed, providing
the ^eans to modernise the armed forces of European H
members and conti r-evious programs of support to Greece,
Turkey, Iran, the Philippines and South Korea. The Mutual
Defense Assltance Program which was enacted was carefully
designed to avoid an arms race, to concentrate prlznarily on
modernization.
The NATO pact had a precedent In the 1^47 Rio de
Janeiro defense agreement entitled the Inter-American Treaty
of Reciprocal Assistance. Both treaties declared that an
attack on any one of the signatories would be considered an
attack on all and called for concerted action including the
use of armed force. The Rio pact did not provide for
material assistance to latin America, however, as the H,
agreement did for Europe, •*«
At a meeting of foreign ministers of the American
3tates la Washington in 1950 it was determined that the
collective defense provisions of the Kio treaty should be
implemented by strengthening those forces which were adapted
to hemisphere defense through cooperative development. The
37* Lorna Morley and Felix Morley, The Patchwork History of





ministers directed the Inter-American Defense Board, as an
operating body of the Organisation of American States, to
plan for this Joint effort. General Bolte, U.S. Army,
Chairman or the Board, appeared before Congressional coaaait-
tees considering the Mutual Defense Assistance Act to support
changes to the Act which would provide for inclusion of
Latin America in its terms. Among other things, his testi-
mony emphasised that a program for rehabilitation of World
War II equipment would distribute responsibility for the
security of the hemisphere, and of the United States, for
which U.3. troops would have to be used otherwise, and that
this would be done at a lower cost through the use of local
troops in Latin America.-'
Hie Mutual security Act of 1931 provided grants-in-aid
to Latin America for maintaining forces for which a role in
hemispheric defense had been assigned. These forces were a
relatively small percentage of the total troops strength of
Latin America, and the money furnished by the act was only
five percent of the total defense budget of Latin America.
ulpment needs beyond those covered by the grants could
still be filled hy purchase in the United States. However,
this portion of the Act was not realistic in that the costs
were not adjusted for a&e and condition of the equipment
involved nor could the purchases be made on credit, until
, Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations,
Hearing* » Mutual Security Act of 1951, d^& Cong., 1st
Sees., pp . 391-39ST

the 1957 modifications to the Act made these steps possible. 39
Other modifications have been made over the years. The
Act of 1951 incorporated all existing foreign assistance
activities (except the Export-Import Bank loans) under a
single act, in recognition of the interdependence of military,
economic, and technical aid. The Mutual Security Act of
1954 replaced the earlier Act, which was to terminate in
I954, 4c
3ince legislators in the United States are cautious
about aid to Latin America because it may help to perpetuate
dictatorial regimes, take on the character of an arms race,
or discourage self-help where it is practicable, the Act
has been amended to provide that Internal security will not
be the basis for military assistance, and that a ceiling of
$55 #000,000 shall be placed on arms aid to Latin America.
Additional proposals and discussions have included channel-
ing aid through the Organisation of American States, limita-
tions on shipment of small arms, payment with strategic
materials, and a proposal for disarmament made by Costa Klca.
JSach of these limitations has some merit, but each has some
disadvantages as well, and the program has not been basically
changed over the years.
Ma^or changes were sought by the Kennedy Administra-
tion In the 1961 hearings on the program. New legislation
was proposed to replace the Mutual Security Act of 195^.
, Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Jielationa,
Hearings , Mutual Security Act of 1251* &5th Cong., 1st
Sess., p. 3^0."
4c. Morley and Horley, p. 30.

. iturea oC the new Act were to be, br :ng
authority for £, strengthening of inter:.
irity capabilities, remoml of the ceiling on the grants
for military aaterial to Latin America, removal of so;ae
conditions respecting eligibility for lU, and provis
r special Presidential powers to deal with emergencies.
The 1961 hearings brought out sosie of the continuing
features of the Mutual Security Act. The grant aid has
been furnished only to the twelve nations which have an assigned
role in hemisphere defense. These ares Colombia, Ecuador,
Peru, Chile, Uruguay, Brazil, Hicaragua, Honduras, Guatemala,
Haiti, Dominican Republic, and Cuba. Deliveries to the last
two on the list have been suspended in view of the conditions
prevailing in these countries. It was argued that the araend-
sent which limited assistance for the purpose of improving
internal security was too restrictive. Trio reasoning was that
the Latin American forces anion are getting U.3. nsaterlal and
training; because of their part in hemisphere defense plans
are V. *St capable units in their respective countries,
yet they .d not be used legally to combat internal dis-
turbance in these countries without U.3. authorisation. A
realistic appraisal indicated that the legal bar would not
41deter use of these forces if the need should arise.
41. U..$,, Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations,
Hearln&s on International Development and Security, 87th
Cong^d7~oesi, .,' ,,I^i; '''^arT^ ppf3>S^6^or^B7 776
.
Military assistance to the Dominican Republic will
probably be renewed. The Hew York limes , January 27,
1962, p. 36 reported the sending of a survey team to
consider the possibility of renewal of the prograst.

The discission and the requested changes, referred to
above, were designed to tailor military aid to the Alliance for
Progress by providing for more flexibility and for longer-
;e development. As in the earlier Mutual Security legisla-
tion, economic and military aid are to be considered together.
An increase in military assistance of $265*000,000 more than
had been proposed in President Kennedy* s budget was requested.
The President said that the increase was necessary to meet
the crises in southeast *isia and the rising threat of
Communism in Latin America, Aides later indicated that the
increase in funds for latin America would be small and would
be used chiefly to strengthen the internal security forces
of those Central American republics which are threatened with
insurrections led by pro-Castro elements.^2
Maintaining and modernizing those Latin American armed
forces which are ear-marked for hemisphere defense has been
a continuing effort since 1952, The sums provided for this
purpose have been relatively small with respect to the total
U,S, assistance effort, never higher than two percent. How-
ever, the importance of the program is not measured in dollars
or percentages but in its effects in terms of security and




, Is and attaches
the formation of an effective armed force, training
is at least as important as bein<s well equipped. To help
42. The Mew York Times, £7 *»» 1^61, p. 1.

train the armed services In 'Lit.. . , the United States
asai? >, representing one or more of the
branches of service, in each of the Latin American republics
except Mexico and, now, Cuba and the Dominican Republic.
Even Costa Rica, which has a Civil Guard force rather than
an srasy, is assisted by a U.S. Army mission . k tabulation
of the missions operating in Latin America in Fiscal 1962
is presented in Table 1.
•o.
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a. U.S., Congress, .Senate, Subcommittee of the Committee on
Appropriations, Bs&gk, . ••3fl&gfr*ge„afc 9X fie*enag. A£ar&aEl»v
Uon& C2X 1-&2, -7th Con*., 1st oess., pp. 9$, 103, and
17B-17S.

: mission personnel may give tactical advice In the
areas of their specialties, but the principal efforts are
to instruct Latin American forces in the mechanics of the
use of U.S. equipment, to assist with maintenance and repair
of the material, and to help prepare Latin American armed
forces for joint operations with each other ana with U.S.
forces. This last is a particularly important function of
the naval missions, since the navies 1 roles are more apt to
involve coordination within a given force, some of the
naval exercli.
i past years have made such requirements,
and standardised formations and procedures are necessary
for effective combat operation. The methods of the missions
differ somewhat depending on the personnel assigned to them
and the country involved, but in at least one case, indi-
vidual efforts were made by mission personnel to translate
U.3. instruction books and to conduct classes which gave
a«
both formal and practical instruction. *
In most cases, the missions also advise the govern-
ments of the countries concerned as to procurement of materi-
als. In some countries of the free world, this function is
performed by Military assistance Advisory Groups (MAAG*s),
and such groups were once common in Latin America, out they
have been superseded in all the Latin American countries
except for Naval M&AG's in Argentina and Uruguay.
43. Interview with LTJG Joseph J^nes, UoN, May 17 > 1^61.
LTJG Jones was formerly attached to the U.S. Naval
Mission, Brazil.

attaches are in ferent category than mission
pe. :1. They are concerned with overt intelligence func-
i3j representation of their country in military matters
in fo-. countries, and Military advice to Unite- zea
arobaas. i in foreign capitals. They have no responsi-
bility for supply or training of the armed forces of the
country to which they are assigned and normally do not inter-
fere with these functions in any way. The nature of their
duties is indicated by the fact that Army attaches are
assigned to all countries of Latin America, including Mexico
and Cuba, but excepting Panama, where the Governor of t
Canal Zone performs the function, and the Dominican Republic,
which has a Marine attache. The Navy has attaches in every
country of South America which has ocean frontage, and also
in Mexico, but none in Central America # where navies are
very small. ^
Postwar Bases
Most of the bases developed in Latin America during
World War II could be more accurately described as commercial
airfield and seaport facilities which were made available to
U.S. forces for minor supply and repair and, in the case of
aircraft, to furnish a route short enough for trans-Atlantic
flights. The difficulties experienced in getting small
security forces stationed at the largest and most important
44. U.S., Congress, Senate, Subcommittee of the Committee on
Appropriations, Hearing, Jepartment of Defense Approprla'
tions for 1^6<2, o7th~~Cons.7~lst 3ess.,~pp. 9#» 103, ami
iyo-179.

facilities &ave ample indication that they could not come
under U.S. control other than in a very Halted and temporary
way, and they ceased to be U.S. baaea after the war. in
I962, the United States has only four bases in the Latin
American area, none of which la strictly a World war II
base. The United States has had bases at Guantanamo Bay,
Cuba and in the Panama Canal Zone since the turn of the
century, long before World fear II. Two missile tracking
stations, one in the Dominican Republic and one on Fernando
de Naranho Island, Brazil, have been constructed in the
late 195c 's, and they are not bases in the same sense as
were the World War II installations. -*
The United States still has limited facilities and
rights at the sites of the Antilles bases obtained from
Great Britain in the destroyer-base arrangements of IS&0.
Flans to grant independence to the west Indies Federation In
1962 meant that agreements with Great Britain had to be
terminated and new ones negotiated with the Federation. An
agreement signed on 10 February 1961 permits the United
States to operate a few small electronic and oceanographie
stations in the several islands of the Federation, but
activity at the Antilles bases had been curtailed greatly
after the war, and the agreement makes no real change in
their status. Provision was made for the use by the United
States of the naval base at Trinidad, and specifically
Waller Field, only in the event of an emergency arising out
4$, Lieuwen, p. 223.

of hostilities. limited agreement was made for use of the
fleet anchorage in peacetime, on presentation of appropriate
notice.^
The present system of bases is not important in terms
of size or amount of current activity, then, although some
of the installations have important, tout limited, technical
functions. However, retention of base rights has some
significant features. It prevents potential enemies from
acquiring them. Future developments, such as anti-missile
missiles, may make the base areas important in the next
few years, anti-submarine patrols and aerial reconnaissance
patrols from Caribbean bases may become necessary in support
of limited actions. Perhaps more important than any of
these in time of peace is liaison between American and
foreign nationals, supplementing that achieved by the missions
and attaches.
1 of the activities described above introduce the
influence of the United States into latin America. There
are a few additional military activities which also exert
an influence, such as attendance hj Latin American officers
at U.3. military schools and work carried on by military
bodies within the 0a3. The effect and effectiveness of
these are discussed in the following chapters.
46. U.o. Department of State, Treaties and Other International
feet* Series 4734, U.S . Defense Areas in the Federation of




M FOKCiiS AMD T&i NEED FOK THUS
Latin American countries are not a.one in feeling a
need for modern armed forces. All but a very £<*w of the
world's sovereign states support sizable military establish*
menta. A rou&h measure of the intensity of this feeling
in the Latin Aaerican republics is the size of their total
defense budget— an annual aura of more than one billion dollars,
or twenty timea the amount furnished to them by the United
States as grant aid. There are many people who feel that
this is an excessive amount, questioning the validity of
assumptions which are the basis for U.S. support of these
armed forces. If there is no threat to the security of the
hemisphere both from within and from without, or if defense
Inst this threat can be met better with forces other than
the Latin american ones, there is little justification for
so hifcji a level of expenditure by either the United States
or its hemispheric neighbors for arsued might in Latin
America. However, recent events in Cubu elsewhere have
made some of the arguments for military stx»engthenin^, of
Latin America more cogent and less speculative.
Lead Time for Military Forces
Host discussions concerning maintenance of strong




naed for then. To be meaningful, discussion of the current
hemisphere defense program must take into consideration the
length of time it takes to form an effective armed force.
Much depends on the start Jlnt, of course, k demonstra-
tion of the difficulties involved, even when the starting
point is with an existing trained organization, was provided
when some National Guard and Organized Reserve units were
placed on active duty in the United States late in 1961. As
a result of this experience, the President and his military
advisers have decided that a better course is to increase
the number of men on active duty with the armed forces and
to reduce the authorized strength of reserve forces, 1
The equipment used by modern military forces is
complex and requires a great deal of technical knowledge and
skill. £ven when the manpower pool from which the forces are
made is highly literate and is experienced in an industrial
society, and the men are integrated into an existing efficient
armed force, it takes an appreciable time for recruits to
become effective members of the force. In a discussion of
the West German Army, Hanson Baldwin stated that, if that
army is to become a good one, the draft would have to be
extended, to eighteen months, since a one year period means
that conscripts are returned to civilian life Just when they
have attained an acceptable standard of training. 2 If the
source of conscripts is an illiterate group, composed largely
*• P?e Wev? *ork Tiroes ' December 3, 1961, p. 1 and i>ecember 15*
IjEl, p. 1.
2 « 1M I!®* York Times, September 16, 1961, p. 4.

of subsistence farmers arvd others who lack mechanical skills,
much more time is required Tor training in literacy, or
the time devoted to learning by doing and through example
must be increased, or both of these courses must be adopted*
A. permanent force of experienced, professional military men
must be maintained at all times to Impart the requisite
skill to new personnel, or else the lead time needed to form
an effective force must be extended considerably.
The technological requirements for maintenance and
use of aircraft, warships, and armored forces are clear,
but even the job of infantry rifleman has become much more
complex over the years. Infantry action must be coordinated
with other arms in most situations, and it has been necessary
increase mobility and communications capabilities of
infantry groups to meet this requirement. Each advance in
efficiency in the employment of infantry has added complica-
tions. Guerrilla training is even more complicated as a rule
because, in addition to mastery of usual infantry skills,
competence in the use of high explosives, in hand-to-hand
combat, and in survival techniques are minimum requirements.
e equipment which has made military operations more
complex requires a long lead time itself before it becomes
available in the field. This remains true when several steps
are eliminated, such as research and design, manufacture of
special tools, etc. Sven if all materials are furnished
from an external source, problems of expansion of production
and of transportation require time for their solution. The

wur *>J
experiences o in America in World fcar II indicate that
the tisie involved can be considerable.
3
The 31.se of latin American Armed Forces
it is tempting to think that because the aroed forces
..tin America have aeesed to be bigger than necessary to
meet apparent threats in the past they may be reduced at
the present time. Actually the threat to hemispheric security
is becoming store prominent with time, and its dimensions are
seen to be larger than was believed, or perhaps to be
increasing. The size of the armed forces cannot be based
solely on the presumed magnitude of current threats but
oust anticipate future conditions because of the lead time
involved. Revelat of Communist influence In Cuba become
progressively more ominous, and internal threats to order are
evident in the violence attending changes of government in
the Dominican Republic* in Brazil, and in Ecuador in late
1961 and early 1962. These conditions Indicate the existence
of sufficient menace to security to require fairl; • e
forces on active duty and to require that these forces be
highly trained so that they cay be expanded quickly.
Determination of optimum size for a country's armed
forces is difficult and imprecise. Certainly no country of
latin America should keep up as large a force in proportion
to its population as does the United States. None has commit-
ments elsewhere on the globe • None has any strength devoted
3. Supra, chap. 11* passim.
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to ballistic missiles. Some have almost no need for a navy;
others require forces only for limited and local use. Latin
American air forces need no heavy bombers and relatively few
tactical aircraft. Based on these considerations, Latin
America would not seem to need more than a fraction of the
numerical strength maintained by the United States. In
fact, Latin America has only about one-fifth as much strength
as does the U.S. If the United States, with i population
about equal to that of all Latin America and with consider-
ably less than half the area, had armed forces responsible
only for training* protection against subversion, and
resistance to small scale assault, only a minority of the
citizens would feel that one-fifth of its present strength
would be excessive for these purposes. A comparison of
armed forces of all members of the 0A3, expressed in terms
of the number of civilians for each member of the armed forces,
is given in Table 2.
Many people who influence or shape the U.S. Military
Assistance Program have gone on record as favoring a reduc-
tion of the total strength of Latin American armed forces.
Those who recommend curtailment of expenditures for arms
for Latin America, most of whom are not officials of the
government of the U.S., do not believe that latin America
has a real role in hemispheric defense. Those who are
U.S. government officials often indicate a belief that Latin
erican forces other than those needed to carry out the


















































The figures are based on those given in The statesman's Year-
book , 1^61-1^62 . Many population figures are estimates, and
In some cases the armed forces' strength is listed by number
of battalions, whose strength is also estimated, Cuba and




Dfflelala of the U.S, department of Defense or of Its aub~
ordinate agencies have not indicated that they share this
belief.^ Reduction of armament .Id never be ruled out,
but it must be approached on t .a is of needs. Iftere are
many considerations which affect the size of ?d
forces, but their role of ,ion to a possible invasion
of the hemisphere is probably paramount in importance and
certainly the principal area of aontro
6* Threat from Without
In discussln, . military policy, a prominent
writer in the field states:
The policy, however, rests on the questionable
aeaumption that latin America is threatened z>mmunist
aggression both from within and without.' Ho serious
observer believes that Soviet sa are about to Invade
the western Hemisphere. Between Russia and Latin .-*raeriea
stand the JUTO powers in 'wester:: ope, the untie
,ean, and the United states navy and air force. The
western side of the area Is even store f - shielded
the vast expanses of the Pacific and by United states
control over the approaches to the hemisphere. With
such natural geographic shields and such powerful anti-
Communist allies, the Idea of a threat of eosaunlet
fc, Lieuwen, p. 252, proposes that the U*S, adopt "a policy
aimed at promotlr. levels of armament v
back military aid and encouraging Latin America to disarmM . '.•ill, of course, Involve she?: ' I • collective
defense %»yth*. ' Charles 0. Porter ana Kobert J. Alexander
in T Latin e in
essential agreement with this position,™ 'Senator Church
in U. enate Hearing 03 .et before
the Committee on Foreign~Reiations, bbth Cbng,"J 2nd Seas,
gave his opinion that no one from the state Department or
the lefenae Deoarttaent could make a case for hemispheric
defense (p. 84). The Assistant Secretary of State for
Inter-American irs, Hoy Hubottom, in the same hearings,
said that most Latin American countries could reduce the
Use of their military establishments, but the U.S. did
not determine the sise and was only interested in the
regional defense aspects {pp, 349-350).
.
.resslon from without is very remote. In the event
of general war, af couraej the Soviet Union might
conceivably direct a small part of Its attention to
Latin America, whose great cities are vulnerable to
missile attacks from submarines, but the main objects
ittack would surely be the United States, its
European allies, ana1 its base system. The fact is that,
in military terms, Latin America is more Isolated than
any other major area In the world fro® the i£aat-West
struggle. It would be hard to imagine a more unlikely
target for an armed Soviet assault.
5
To dismiss all possibility of aggression from without,
simply because of the remoteness of the possibility of
invasion by Russian forces, is a dangerous procedure. Mili-
tary aggression may take many forms other than mass trans-
portation of troops. Communist action is not restricted to
Soviet forces, nor are Communists the only possible invaders,
discussion of the merit of a given policy should not be
restricted to a statement made years earlier of one of the
fundamentals on which the policy rested, but should include
all current considerations.
Russian submarines could be the instrument for one
type of invasion of Latin America. The use of submarines
as troop carriers constitutes diversion from more profitable
employment of their characteristics as a rule. However, If
a territory is to be vanquished by a fifth column, directed
by relatively few nationals of the attacking country who
can assume key position, submarines are the optimum means
for getting them in position for simultaneous initiation of
5. Lieuwen, pp. 2C In presenting this view, Mr. Lieuwen
has cited a statement appearing in the U.S. Department of
xt& Bulletin , March 30 , 1954, He exempts political and
economic aggression from this discussion of military aspects,

such an effort in i .vocations. This Is a particularly
strong possibility In South America because so ©any of Its
countries are centered on a single, major, coastal metropolis,
as much aisle to control the country in enemy hands as it
does now in the hands of its own government.
An attempt to seize control of Latin America con-
currently with a general attack on the United states is
possible also. An enemy would be remiss if he failed to
make the effort. The very submarines which would launch
missiles toward the United States could do so from positions
near Caribbean countries with today *s relatively short
range weapons* .As the range of submarine launched missiles
is increased, as it undoubtedly will be for all navies so
equipped, this possibility can be extended to include posi-
tions near all Latin American countries. Even submarines of
limited range could be used for the purpose of landing mili-
tary personnel because they could be expected to base in the
newly conquered country, or, if necessary, be abandoned
after having served the primary purpose.
£nemy submarines based in Latin American countries
would be in optimum position to block assistance to the
United States. Non-availability of the resources of South
America would cripple efforts in the United States to recover
from the effects of a nuclear halocauat. Subversion of
nerican countries by a power hostile to the U.S. would
eliminate them as sources of supply. If the attempt at
control should not succeed or not be made in some countries,

submarines based in others would toe able to prevent the
.x-c nations from aiding the Unite .tea. Doubtless
Europe would suffer a severe assault at the same time that
an all-out attack on the Uni .tatea occurs, but even if
these nations were able to furnish some material help to
our country, .soviet submarines operating from Latin American
ports, particularly those north of the equator, would be in
a better position to oppose this effort than if they operated
fro® Russian bases. The same reasoning applies to thwart i
aid from Africa and probably Australia and the South Pacific
as well.^
Preoccupation with the Communist threat has diverted
attention from the possibility and the consequences of
military threats by non-nuclear powers* None is on the
horizon now, but the possibility can never be completely
eliminated. It should not be encouraged by a position of
such weakness as to preclude adequate defense. In World War
II, more than 100,000 U.S. troops had to be diverted to Latin
America to protect net a possible Invasion because the
Latin American armed forces could not be brought up to the
strength required for effective opposition until at least
three years after the threat had been reoo^ni^ed and the
decision to furnish anas had been made.?
6. The limiting factor for submarine patrols against merchant
ships noraially is expenditure of torpedoes. These could be
shipped to Soviet controlled Latin American ports by the
time the submarines return Urom their first patrol.
7. U.S. Con&reas, senate Committee on Foreign iielations,




ision of one La .^ican republic by another is
jsslble, but it recurred or been attempted
several times since the Mutual Security Act became operative
fc» Latin America. The 0&£ has been very effective in
handling these disturbances, at least in the small scale
operations which have arisen, I jh on two occasions its
action was requested but could not be used. However, the
cion is not perfect, and it would be a serious
mistake to conclude that its peaceful settlement procedures
would be equally effective in conflicts between the larger
and stronger states of Latin America, No one can be sure
what kinds of government will follow those of the dictators*
though the government which came to power in the Dominican
Hepuolic after General Trujillo'a assassination gives indica-
tions of adhering to democratic ideals in it3 early days.
The example of Cuba under Castro demonstrates that democracies
do not necessarily arise under these conditions, and the
difficulty experienced at the meeting of forei era
at the 0A5 in Uruguay in January ij62 in reaching agreement
on how to deal with a Cuban government which threatens
hemispheric security, indicatea that the cannot achieve
a satisfactory solution under all circumstances.^
, J. Lloyd Mecham, The United States and Inter-American
Security , • l^bT" ( Austin, University' of ' texas £ress
,
1), p. 406 and' p. 422. Lieuwen considers the n&&6 for
defensive assistance greatly reduced by the existence of the
O&S. He cites its effectiveness in a 1955 conflict between
ior and Peru, which Mecham discusses as a case where
the peace machinery was not utilised though action was taken
under the Rio Treaty. Lieuwen treats this whole subject In
a brief paragraph on pages 213 and 214.
&• 22* !!*£ t°*k lUg®** February 19&2, p» 3.

If the O.U cannot arrive at a means of halting the
limited invasions and the subversion attempts by the Castro
government through joint action, the individual nations must
be prepared to counter such moves. Brigadier General W. A.
iinemark, Director, Western Hemisphere Region, Office,
Assistant secretary of Defense for Internal Security Affairs,
has stated the view of the Kennedy administration:
..•the announced intentions of the Castro regime to
promote the overthrow of Latin American governments by
indirect aggression. Including deliberate use of sub-
version and guerilla warfare, is confronting countries
in the hemisphere with a grave new threat to their
security. Unless they develop the will, individually
and jointly, to deal effectively with this new threat,
they stand in danger of losing the opportunity for
orderly economic and social growth within a framework
of free institutions.
The repeated public statements of leaders of the
Castro regime leave no room for doubt that they plan to
employ the insidious strategy of indirect aggression in
all its forms to replace constitutional governments with
totalitarian regimes patterned on the Castro model.
For all of the American Republics, this constitutes an
imminent and serious threat to the peace and security
of the hemisphere.
The insidious character of this type of warfare
has created for Latin American armed forces critical new
requirements for military training and equipment. They
are turning to us for help In developing the special
type of capabilities required to seek out, destroy, or
take Into custody arms and bands of armed men which
move clandestinely across their land, sea and air borders
for subversive purposes; to deal effectively with dis-
orders in the cities j and to prevent or control guerrilla
outbreaks in rural areas.
The nature of the threat and the flexibility needed to meet
it successfully as it arises in several countries were cited
by General iinemark as necessitating removal of the ceiling on
1C. U. 3. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relatione,
Hearings on Internationa l Development and Security , 87th
Cong., 2d Sess., lS<bl, Fart 2, pp. Il5-Tf6.

expenditures for military aid for Latin America.
The United States as Bole Defender
The Hio treaty binds the American Republics to collec-
tive defense of the hemisphere against aggression. There
can be no doubt that only the United States is capable of
perforating atony of the tasks which might be entailed in
is defense. However, this is not sufficient reason to
relieve the other ries in the hemisphere of responsibility
for cooKnon defense. An attack a^lnst the United States with
nuclear armed missiles would leave its conventional forces
decimated, their mobility disrupted. Latin America r
then have to assume the burden of self-defense. Another
consideration is the desire of La 1, mericans to furnish,
or at least participate in, their own defense. The sensitive-
ness of Brazil to this issue in World War II, discussed above,
is an example.
Even if it were possible from a political point of
view to have the United States provide for all the defense
needs of the hemisphere, there is some doubt that this is
the best method . General Lennitzer, Chairflsan, Joint Chiefs
of Staff stated at a Congressional heari ;
I look upon military assistance to our allies as adding
strength and depth to the siilitary posture of the United
States. It enables our allies I -*, train and
equip units which enhance the capability of the free
world to taeet the challenge of Communist agression ar
subversion. Ho amount of tnoney spent ur forces
ive the United States a comparable ass>
trained, well-equipped forces, familiar with the

teri - .nd ~h for im te
reaiayihoe to iocaX^iggresalan . "^^EaXics mine./**
Anti-submarine warfare (AaW) is an important part of
hemispheric defense. The world has long known of Russia's
numerical strength in submarines . Now Soviet subctarlnea
with missile launching capabilities have been observed.
Anti-submarine patrols are difficult and arduous, and the
ships which are employed for patrols are of limited endurance.
The forces engaged in A3W work must have adequate support
from bases ne&r the patrol area. Even if the ASW forces of
the United States were not already stretched very thin and
were not forced to use ships that are approaching the end
of their useful lives, the problem of bases would make it
most desirable that Latin American countries assist with
the ASW effort.
The need of some countries for submarines has been
questioned, particularly Peru, which had four expensive
submarines built to her specifications by a private shipyard
in the United States in 1994 and 1957. Whatever the motive
for such acquisitions, these ships can be put to good use
in anti-submarine warfare. Developments in the United States
in the last few years have resulted in marked advances in
the use of submarines as submarine killers. Adapting the
U.3* methods and equipment to the submarines of Latin American
navies is no more difficult than equipping and training their
11. U. ress, Senate, c a,












surface Am forces. Besides, train! M forcea is beat
accomplished through the use of submarines which are always
available.
k similar line of reasoning can be applied to the
recent acquisition of aircraft carriers by Brazil and
Argentina. Aircraft carriers are versatile and can be
•qployed in many operations in ado it ion to ant1-submarine
warfare. There are, of course, conventional uses of project-
ing air power in a given combat area. A more recent develop-
ment, and one which seems especially applicable to Latin
America, is the vertical envelopment concept of the U.S.
Marine Corps. This technique Involves the use of helicopters
from carriers for ship-to-shore movement of troops. In an
area where nobility on land is limited and extensive areas
are relatively remote from centers of control, this procedure
permits the use of rather small forces to Insure internal
security.
The 8*8, armed forces cannot spread themselves too
thin. The Navy has made some show of strength in times of
incipient disorder, as it did in the case of the Dominican
Republic in November 1961. i2 However, there are limits as
to what may be done and how effective the action may be.
Sven more important is the reception which such procedures
have in a Latin America which is unusually sensitive to
intervention. If more than a single country were involved,
or if the disorder were widespread within a country, it
12. The New York Times, November 20, 1961, p. 1.

Id be most difficult, if not impossible, to furnish
adequate military strength in sufficient time, even if such
assistance were requested promptly. In any event, this
could only be done with reasonable assurance, in the absence
of latin American forces, through a such larger expenditure
by the United States than it now makes for defense forces
for the hemisphere and, of course, a larger proportion of
manpower in its armed forces than is now required.
The ^Threat from Within
-ccessful subversion of a government In Latin America
is a matter of serious concern to all the American republics
if it results in control of a country by a group whose
ideology and actions are inimical to the continued well being
of the other nations. While the possibility la not confined
to Communist activity, this has tmrna the most active and most
worrisome one in recent years. There are several individual
countries in latin America which are attractive targets for
Communist domination. Panama is an obvious one, not so much
for its wartime importance, which has diminished, as for
the possibilities it presents for disrupting peace-time
trade and for political embarrassment of the United states.
Venezuela, with her oil, is another. A Communist Mexico
would be an undesirable neighbor for the United States.
actually, a Communist government I ore in Latin America
is troublesome, and United states response to the fact or
threat of such a government may be seen in its actions and




The size o£ the Communist party In a given country ia
not necessarily a true indication of Communist strength or
potential there. Latin American nations have been dominated
by a very small percentage of the public throughout their
history. This percentage has slowly increased fi*ora about one
percent in colonial times to about ten percent in the i960 'a • ^
A large part of the influential group consists of the intel-
lectuals, who are often left-leaning and Blight be the more
readily influenced by a strong Communist campaign for a
specific goal. Trade uniona are alao suaceptible to auch a
move. The appropriation of a revolutionary movement by
Communists and the way in which this can be done waa demon-
strated by the Castro regime in Cuba. 3uch succeaa aa the
Communiata have had in Latin America aince ^orld War II has
been due largely to their ability to exploit the political,
social, and economic revolution which pervades all of Latin
America.
^
It ia sometimes argued that internal threats are a
police matter and that there is no need for an army to deal
with internal security matters. ^ Thia aeema to be too
13. John J. Johnson, lecture on *> January 1962.
14. Mecham, p. 425.
15. Lleuwen, p. 213. He states that, while Communist
capacities for subversion through penetration, propa-
ganda, and influence in such organizations as trade
unions do represent a serious threat in aome countries,
thia is not a military problem, that in most countries
the task of preserving internal order against Comrauniat
subversion is mill handled by the police, and that in
any event the armed forcea were capable of maintaining
internal order before they began to get aid from the
United States.

narrow a view and one wh ...nee with the facta
of Ufa, not only in Latin America, but in advanced countries
such as the United States. Sometimes disturbances are of
such magnitude, or there is such divergence between national
and local interests, that police work can only be performed
adequately by array units. The use of federal troops to cope
with racial disturbances in Little Hoc .*kanaas, and the
frequent use of the National Guard by the various states in
times of strike violence, or when floods may bring looting
or disorder, are examples of conditions in the United States
which require that troops perform police functions. The
Latin American nations experience conditions in which dis-
order ctnd violence erupt more frequently, yet these countries
also have very extensive areas which are not under the effec-
tive control of any civil law enforcement agencies. In some
republics, a major part of its total area is almost unoccupied,
as in the Amazonian sections of i£cuador and Peru, or the
Guiana highlands of Venezuela. In fact, this last republic
demonstrates well the need for troops to cope with civic
strife. Violence broke out coincident with the 1962 Meeting
of Consultation of the Foreign Ministers of the OAS to con-
sider chastizing Cuba. The President of Venezuela called
out Army patrols after a bomb blew a hole in the wall of the
United States Embassy. Continued violence resulted in calling
out marine and parachute units to reinforce troops in
Caracas, the capital. i.6
*£• The New York Times, January 24, 1962, p. 10.

The police are never as good as the armed forces In
caliber of personnel, discipline, or training. Nor are they
organized in such a way as to be effective beyond a restricted
locality. Therefore, they are more limited in their capa-
bility to counter subversion on a large scale and in many
places at the same time. The armed forces are frequently
called upon to cope with disturbances which have gone beyond
the point where the police can handle them. This is usually
a distasteful situation for the armed forces when it results
from strikes or protests over domestic issues, but the
military forces would be more than willing to act where the
nation or its institutions are Jeopardised.
Events in British Guiana in February 1962 illustrate
the need for armed forces and their role in preserving in-
ternal order, h similar need and role would apply to counter-
subversive activity. The country is a British colony, but
it has full internal self-government, including responsi-
bility for internal security, and Prime Minister Jagan has
been pressing for complete independence by August 1962. A
general strike arose in opposition to the Prime Minister's
budget and constitutional proposals. The government of
British Guiana was forced to appeal to the British governor
for British troops when the 1500 man constabulary was unable
to control mobs which embarked on a rampage of looting and
arson. Racial enmity between negro and East Indian inhabitants
was a big factor in the violence. One-third of the capital*s
business district was destroyed, and losses are equivalent

to one-sixth of the annual production of the country.
British troops numbering less than 600 restored order rather
easily, even though they arrived after the rioting had become
severe. Prime Minister Jagan has indicated that he will form
a national army to deal with the possibility of future out-
bursts against the government. Unfortunately, in this case,
the national army is apt to be used for political purposes. *?
Though British Guiana is a non-Latin country of the hemi-
sphere, its problems in this incident were not significantly
different from those which might arise in the neighboring
Latin countries.
Anarchy in a country is itself a threat to hemispheric
security, whether or not it is exploited by Communists acting
to further the movement's international goals. It often
brings into power a government which is repugnant to the
rest of the hemisphere, as was that of Rojas Pinilla in
Colombia ( 1953-1957 ). In addition it retards the growth of
the country, as continuous civil strife in the years from
19^6 to 1958 did in Colombia, through waste of lives, funds,
and economic opportunities.* Civil police cannot be expected
to bring order when army efforts in several years under
martial law have not been able to do so. ^
17. The New York Times , February 17, 1962, p. lj February
£0, 1552, P. 13? February 21, 1962, p. 5; February 23,
1902, p. 6.
18. Hubert Herring, & History of Latin America From the
Beginning to the~JrreservF*(Jlew York: Alfred A. Knopf, I96I),
ppT 51b1 -522.
19. The New York Times , July 3* 196l, p. 3* reported five
departments ot central Colombia under a state of siege.
The issue of 13 October 1961, p. 34, reported the decree

In countries which have no army, Internal security
I often maintained by a national police force. The differ-
ence between a national police force and an array is not a
sharp one. Costa Riea*s Constitution of 1848 abolished the
army and substituted a civil guard, but the U.S. has an
army mission there in 1962. In Panama, the chief of police,
Jose Antonio Keraon, was the actual ruling power at least
from Ijbj until his assassination in 1955. In the countries
which the United States Marine Corps occupied in the early
ISOQ's, Nicaragua, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic, it
was energetic officers of the Marine Corps— trained constabu-
laries who exercised power as soon as U.S. occupation ended. 2C
The need for armed forces and the strength required
are matters which cannot be determined with precision. If a
country errs in this respect, it will probably be on the safe
side. The defense forces maintained may be somewhat larger
than seem warranted by existing conditions, but the strength
level may reflect recognition of the lead time required to
build up armed forces, and the military establishments may
fulfill other needs, either actual or intangible.
of a state of emergency, a modified form of martial law,
after an attempted revolt involving army personnel.
20. Herring, pp. 433, 441, 466, 469, 475-476.

CHAPTER IV
U.S. MILITARY PROGRAMS IN LATIN AMERICA
U.S. military programs in Latin America are not simply
examples of largesse. The success of these activities in
preparing Latin American armed forces for effective self-
defense may be measured by the extent to which they relieve
the United States of the need to provide manpower for this
purpose. There are other benefits, or at least potential
benefits, which accrue to the United States from its Mutual
Security Program. There are potential hazards too, but
mistakes of the past, few of which escaped notice and comment,
appear to be providing effective guideposts for the present
and future. The United States has modified its military
programs, not merely by eliminating certain objectionable
policies, but rather through changes In basic military
thinking.
Changes in U.S. Military Thought
A major, recent change in U.S. military thought has
placed Increased emphasis on conventional and guerrilla
forces. The Influence of General Maxwell Taylor, long an
advocate of this change, in his present position as advisor
to President Kennedy, fosters revision of U.S. military
programs along this line. An early example was delivery of




1 riotit report on the U.S. u*my Caribbean School
at Fort Guiick, Canal Zone Indicates that the school, which
graduated more than 10,COO members of Latin American
armed forces in twelve years of operation, added a new and
comprehensive course in counter-resistance operations in
August 1961. The course is based on a curriculum developed
for the U.S. Army's Special Forces and has been expanded to
fit the problems of latin America. Its work is doubly
important because half the class members, at least in the
earlier classes, will teach similar courses in their own
countries. 2 The training may not be an unmixed blessing,
however. A rebel &roup in Guatemala, which began operations
in February 1962, was led by officers who had graduated from
the school at Fort Gulick, though it appears that they com-
pleted their training before the newest course was started. *
The t .rmy has maintained Special Forces, trained
in guerrilla warfare, for some time, but the increased
emphasis on this type of activity is indicated by the appoint*
raent, in January 1962, of the Army's youngest general to a
new post as special assistant to the Chief of Staff, U. S.
Army, with the rank of major general, to direct the Army's
efforts in guerrilla warfare. The general's responsibilities
Include "para-military operations, psychological and unconven-
tional warfare, and the employment of irregular forces."^
1. The New York Times, July 12, 1961, p. 3.
2. fKe Sew fork times, August 27, 19ol, p. 29.
3. ^hi* F?ew jfork Times , February 16, 1962, p. 7.
4. the Hew ¥or'K times , January 25, 19o2 # p. lo.
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The f he will command have been expanding; the proposed
Depart of Defense appropriations for provided for
more than doubling the special forces by adding 3000 spaces,-*
Military Aspects of the Programs
If the United States government has become convinced
that it is necessary to expand its own conventional forces
and guerrilla forces, previous arguments for reduction of
the conventional forces of Latin America have lost some of
their validity, particularly if these forces are modified
and trained to cope with guerrilla activity. In fact, it
is with forces of this type that Latin America can make its
major contribution to common defense, the need for which was
discussed in Chapter III. In doing so, latin America can
relieve the United States of the need to build up its own
forces still more, secretary of the army Stahr expressed
the need for Joint action by the U.S. and Latin America (among
others) in this statement:
Of particular importance now, and in my opinion,
most likely of increasing importance in the years ahead,
is the task the Army is doing to improve substantially
its capabilities, as well as those of selected countries,
to meet challenges presented in the form of subversion,
insurgency, and guerrilla actions. This is primarily
an Army Job.
By strengthening our Special Forces this type of
challenge can be countered with increased effectiveness.
The numbers of allied indigenous forces, particularly
in peripheral areas, trained to combat insurgency,
subversion, and guerrilla actions can be increased
measurably. In addition, critically important training
5. U.S. Congress, Senate, subcommittee of the Committee on
appropriations, Hearings , Department of Defense Appropria -
tions for 1962 , 67th Con&., 1st Sess., 19ol, p. 5^7"
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of these forces in such fields as counterintelligence
and o~— affairs, .to complete
success in such type operations, can be stepped up,
reover, thu indigenous Spec! >rces can be
formed in friendly countries. I am greatly impressed
.;* the imagination, energy, and realistic planni:
and training which are going into this Special Forces
effort.^
oucretary of Defense MeNamara stated that a detachment of
two officers and ten enlisted men of the special Forces can
organise and train 1300 indigenous personnel in the conduct
of guerrilla or anti-guerrilla operations. ' 2ftis would
apply primarily to situations such as that in Viet-Nara, but
it indicates what may be done in Latin Amei m well.
Hot all of the equipment and training assistance
being furnished to Latin America is up-to-date, however.
The criticism is sometimes made that the armies are equipped
with "yesterday^ weapons, hand-me-downs from the world's
first-rank military powers. Still, the older weapons may
be quite appropriate to the conditions under which they will
be used, A troop of horsemen may be more effective than a
tank battalion in controlling an unruly mob, Much depends on
the equipment of opposing forces, and subversive .;pa as
well have difficulty in procuring arms which can effectively
counter even obsolescent weapons in the hands of the national
armies. I4any of the most modern weapons require logistic
support of a nature which cannot be achieved in Latin America
at present, and the lack of a well developed transportation
6, U.3. Congress, Senate, Subcommittee of the Committee on
Appropriations, H Department of Defense Appropria-
tions for 1962, 37£K Con^.Tlst Sess,7 19bl, p. o^T





network would reduce the effectiveness of many military
equipments or make them inappropriate to the areas of
intended use.
Even an elite anti-guerrilla force would have to draw
its members from a larger army which had been trained with
relatively unsophisticated equipment. And that army, in
order to Incorporate more advanced equipment, would have
to master less complicated arms and vehicles first. The
status of Latin American armed forces during World War II
and the Korean War indicate that they can use older equip-
ment to advantage for training purposes and for meeting
the limited opposition they might expect to find, under
conditions which do not especially favor the most modern
arms. Of course, weapons must be replaced with newer equip-
ment whenever spare parts and ammunition cease to be avail-
able.
replacement of arms for which the supply of parts and
ammunition is uncertain is one of the major goals of the
Mutual Security Program as it applies to Latin America, hs
a general aim, weapons standardization, using U.S. arms, has
been adopted by all Latin American countries through the
approved program of the Inter-American Defense Board, which
has members from each American republic. However, grants are
made to only ten countries which have bilateral treaties with
the U.S., and some purchases of military equipment from
ropean sources have occurred.- standardisation is a logical
Lieuwen, p. _

Litary aim, based an the desire to eliminate supply
problems such as those which arose at the start of World
War IX.
~
c In addition, the program does provide for some
over-all economies in the hemispheric defense system by
permitting continued use of equipment which is obsolescent
for major combat actions but far from worn out or unusable
for less demanding conditions. The program is concerned
with major weapons— socae of the Latin American countries
have equipped themselves with small arms of their own or
foreign design and manufacture.
The standardization program is one indication that
the U.S. military assistance efforts in Latin America
profited from world War II experiences and in many ways
continue the precedents of the lend lease programs established
at that time. The current program is not militaristic. It
is carried on with the active support of the State Department,
as may be seen by the appearance and statements of several
officers of that department, including the secretary of state,
at annual Congressional hearings on the Mutual Security Act.
The Latin American countries are allocated only a small pro-
portion of the total amount disbursed under the provisions
10, Lieuwen states on p. 222 that he considers standardiza-
tion primarily a political tool, a means of keeping out
Soviet missions by keeping out Soviet weapons. However,
there are other ways of keeping the soviet influence out
of latin America, and the use of a standardization pro-
am for this purpose is at best secondary, standardiza-
tion is intended to exclude arms from European sources
as well as Communist sources, because of the supply-
difficulties engendered.

of the Act, This amount does not, and 13 not expected to,
underwrite more than a small fraction of the cost of the
Latin American armed forces, nor does it determine their
total strength. The emphasis is not on small arms nor on
offensive armaments but on equipment which contributes
directly to hemispheric defense through ASW operations and
the maintenance of internal stability. Because the contribu-
tions -which the various countries can make to hemispheric
security differ, the amount of aid tendered to each differs
also.
The military missions which are an integral part of
the U.S. military assistance effort are useful in ways other
than training for common defense. They permit the U.S.
ernment to be continually aware of the military situation
within the countries of Latin America, supplementing the
observations of the attaches. To some extent this applies
also to political and social trends. Knowledge of this
widespread awareness by the U.S. reduces suspicion and mis-
trust among the Latin American nations, because they realise
that it is no longer possible for the actions of their heml-
11
spheric neighbors to be carried on in complete secrecy.
These countries also have some knowledge of U.S. military
thinking and planning through contact with U.S. miiitai
missions. More i3 involved hex^e than overt intelligence
collection. i)ay-to-day collaboration in training, planning,
and administration should give greater ins t into the
11. iSdgar s. Furniss, Jr. (ed.), American Military Policy
(New York* Rinehart & Company, Inc., 19SYJ» p. ^"2.

motivation of Latin American movements and of the nationals
who participate in them.
Surely the United States military leaders are not so
omniscient that there can be no contribution in military
tactics, technique, or thought by the members of the Latin
American armed forces, especially insofar as local conditions
are concerned. This too might logically occur in the course
of the normal operations of missions. There are other oppor-
tunities as well. Joint exercises have been conducted with
Latin American forces, and these are frequently productive
of new ideas. Formal schooling has also been a continuing
feature of U.S. military assistance to Latin America. It is
conducted for almost ail levels of rank and professional
skill. i2 The courses at the War Colleges and at the Command
and Staff College may be the most important from a purely
military point of view. It is at schools on this level
where the exchange of ideas is most apt to result in signifi-
cant contributions by Latin American officers to the common
store of military knowledge.
Integration with Political Goals
and Economic Aid
Collaboration in military matters certainly would be
expected to result in a climate favorable to the attainment
of U.S. political objectives in Latin America. Among these
12. The author has had classmates from Latin American countries
at the U.S. Naval Academy, U.S.N. Submarine School, New
London, and U.S. Fleet Sonar School, Key West.

aims are promotion of Internal stability, exclusion of
Soviet influence, preservation of the 0X3, access to bases
when they are needed, access to strategic materials, and
prevention of international disputes, 3^ while these objec-
tives Blight be achieved if there were no military assistance
program, the military efforts must support, not hamper,
the attainment of the desired political ends. Actually,
military aid is quite effective, by itself and in conjunc-
tion with economic aid, in realizing objectives which are
not strictly military,
Lucien W, Pye sees the relationship between military
and economic aid in these terms
t
In seeking a realistic estimate of the potential role
of the military in the political development of par-
ticular countries it is also necessary to avoid being
excessively influenced by ideological considerations
which may be relevant only in advanced societies. We
have in mind, in particular, the western stereotype
of the military as a foe of liberal values. This bias,
for example, tends at present to take the form of
seeing 'military aid' as a threat to economic and
political development and of assuming that only
•economic aid 1 can make a positive contribution to
such form of development. In some cases 'military aid*
13 Lieuwen, pp. 218-225. Mr, Lieuwen considers political
cooperation to achieve these goals as the primary objec-
tive of U.S. military programs in Latin America. The
relative position of the political factor is dependent
on whether or not one believes that Latin America has
an established military role in hemispheric defense.
Determination of the primacy of the political or mili-
tary considerations is material Insofar as justifica-
tion for the amount and kind of military assistance
rendered is concerned, not the validity of the political
goals. The U.S. is now less willing to give military
equipment to a country simply because it may be politic
to accede to requests by Latin American governments,
Venezuela negotiated for some time to get a submarine
for training, Agreement was reached only after Venezuela
committed itself to allow Colombia to share in the
services of the submarine, according to LCi>H Ortega,

in fact made substantial contributions to road
building, health facilities, communications networks
the like, all of which have directly facilitated
economic growth. In other cases it has been equally
clear that our military aid has seriously retarded
economic development by diverting an excessive amount
of the nation's energies into unproductive channels.
...it is possible, and indeed it is essential, to
expand a narrow relationship with the military into
a much broader one. Military aid has had to become
economic aid.
Mr. Pye believes that military and economic aid efforts
are sometimes overly concerned with administrative functions
and need closer contact with the politicians of the recipient
country. His remarks refer primarily to the emerging nations




While military and economic aid can and should be
complementary, they need not be competitive in terms of
available funds. Since military aid to Latin America can
reduce the manpower requirements of the U.S. armed forces,
this assistance can be considered as competing for resources
with the domestic military programs of the U.S. rather than
with foreign economic aid. 1^ There is no clear-cut
Venezuelan Navy, in an interview on 7 tlarch 1962.
14. Lucien W. Pye, "Armies in the Process of Political Moderni-
zation," The Role o£ the Military in Underdeveloped
Countries , ed. John J. Johnson (Stanford University,
unpuEIisn'ed manuscript, 1961), pp. 159-161.
15 • Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research, "The Pur-
poses of United States Military and Economic Assistance,"
known as
EKe JSraper Report. The Committee did not" necessarily
ree with nor adopt the contents of the studies included
as annexes in the supplement.

distinction in the effects of aid on the budgets of the
recipients, since .id, whether of dollars or of materi
permits the receivl government to divert to some other use
funds of i' m $ which had been earmarked for the same
purpose. Receipt of military equipment, for instance, allows
a government to increase non-military segments of its budget
if.
the amount it had planned to spend fo. >. While the
Military budgets of Latin America are often high in terms
percentage of the total government expenditure, the sum is
actually quite small, often less than that spent by a major
U.S. city for its fire and police protection. In any event,
only a small part of the military budget in Latin American
countries uses up foreign exchange. The remainder is returned
to the local economy in wages and for purchases of food,
clothing, etc. Thus, even though no production ia involved
in expenditures for the armed forces, no serious problem
arises in connection with the military budget.*? In relation
to gross national product, the Latin American military
budgets are next to the lowest in the world, at 2,9$t. 2*>
return, the countries benefit from civic betterment of mili-
tary trainees. ib
Military personnel acquire skills that are useful to
their countries. To improve these skills is not a primary
function of U.S. military assistance to Latin America, nor
16. Arnold Wolfers, "questions of Priority in Mutual Security
Allocation," Draper Report , Annex B. , p. 37.
17. John J. Johnson, lecture on February 20, 1962.
18. Mecham, p. 34l .
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can it be as the programs are now constituted. As a secondary
effect, however, military training which contributes to the
capability of the Latin American armed forces to further
economic and social progress is very important. Host of
these capabilities are of an engineering or communications
nature, and many are best exercised by individuals rather
than by organized military units, so expansion of U.S. mili-
tary effort in this area does not seem to be warranted now.
If the Latin American republics themselves expand the civic
undertakings performed by their military agencies, then the
U.S. would do well to expand this facet of military training,
particularly if integration of all U.S. agencies engaged in
furnishing aid is continued. Military equipment which may
be applied to non-military use in such programs is now being
supplied to Latin America, and the supply of this type of
equipment could be increased without dixTiculty.
Latin America presents some special problems in connec-
tion with aid programs. John P. Gillen Indicates the sort of
rapport which, if established, will be conducive to the success
of a given program.
Traditionally, for the middle-status individual, only
those with whom he feels an intimate, personal relation-
ship are trustworthy. Personal friendship, plus a
kinship relationship of some kind, is essential for
•getting something done.* ... Similarly, any 'program, 1
such as Point Four, requires the 'personal touch' if
it is to succeed. North American administrators and
experts, regardless of their personal competence, will
have little success in their dealings with the middle
segments unless they are able to develop personal
confidence and evoke siropatia .3-5
19. John P. Gillen, "Some Signposts for Policy," Social Change
in Latin America Today , It3 Implications for United States
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The similarities of education, experience, and aims of mili-
tary men should make the establishment of the necessary
relationship easier and more complete than is possible for
civilian experts.
The practice of having Latin American military person-
nel attend schools in the U.S. helps to foster the develop-
ment of almpatia . Perhaps an even more important effect i3
that of permitting these officers and men to see the U.S.
at first hand. A respect for the political institutions of
the U.S. may well result from such acquaintance. Furthermore,
an appreciation of U.S. technology gained from a tour at
school may have important repercussions in Latin American
countries.
If the rapport between military personnel of the
United States and of Latin America can be intensified, its
influence may extend to other portions of the U.S. aid effort.
The Alliance for Progress has fostered more coordination of
the agencies involved in aid to Latin America. To some
extent, as military personnel act in closer conjunction
with other agencies, the rapport established may be trans-
ferred to the civilian groups. This is particularly true
in countries where military officers play leading roles in
industry and public service.
In some countries, the military is the only group
with national interests and a unifying influence. Under
Policy , Council on Foreign Relations (New Y>rk: Harper
& Brothers, i960), p. 32.
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these conditions a close relationship with U.S. military
personnel do&& serve political purposes, particularly in
terms of stability and exclusion of Communist influence.
There is some danger that too close a tie to such a group
may have an adverse effect if the group* s influence is
diminished or if an opposition group supersedes it. Past
errors of uncritical support of military dictatorships,
highlighted hy the presentation of personal decorations to
the dictator by high U.S. government officials, have been
widely publicised. The difficulties experienced by Vice
President Nixon on his trip to Latin America, and the
protocol for dealing with authoritarian governments which
he evolved as a result, have made a lasting impression in
the United States, and there seems to be little doubt that
the U.S. government will be circumspect in its dealings with
latin American countries.
In being circumspect, the U.S. government may elect
to place little emphasis on the political effects of U.S.
military assistance. Some critics feel that the military
programs even now are working counter to U.S. foreign policy
interests in Latin America. If this was in fact true of
military assistance in the 1990*8 it is less true now.
Chan^inti conditions in the hemisphere, changes in military
thought, and changes in the administration of the several
concurrent aid programs have acted to make U.S. railitar
assistance to latin America more important than ever. The
promotion of stability and the secondary effects of

technological and ec Lc development are important to
nth of prosperity and modernity in the nations of
Latin America. In helping to brin . nit these thi.
military programs support the aims of U.3, foreign policy.

CHAPTER V
THiS DOMESTIC HOLK OF LATIN AMxi&ICAN aWUD FORI
The military establishments of Latin America are
influential in many sectors of national life, lncludl
politics, as they are in underdeveloped countries generally.
Their influence may not Invariably be beneficial, but usually
it contributes in some measure to the best interests of their
countries. The significant points are that military influ-
ence Increasingly is exercised with moderation, that it is
used to protect widely accepted values from extremist action
rather than to preserve intact the status quo, that It Is
effective In situations which do not lend themselves to
civilian effort, &ftd that these considerations indicate a
maturation of the armed forces which the Latin American
republics have sought, In view of the pervasive nature of
their influence at the present time, it is unlikely that the
armed forces of Latin America will permit much diminution
of their strength or role except by an evolutionary process.
In addition, the republics of latin America have a fairly
sizable capital Investment In military equipment which they
probably will maintain for 3ome time. If the armed forces
are &oin£ to retain their present status, it would seem that
the optimum course would be to utilize these forces in every





Latin America had no need for large military establish-
ments before the wars for independence in the early lSoG's.
Indian populations numbering thousands had been conquered by
Spanish conquistadores with only a few score armed men in
each area of subjugation. An even smaller number sufficed to
keep the Indians under control, since they had been accus-
tomed to domination by their own rulers, and the major use
of army units in the colonial period was to garrison the
coastal and frontier areas. Preservation of order was not
possible outside the limits of the cities and towns, but
none was necessary because the Spanish population pattern
was such that all important functions were concentrated in
a very few cities, a condition which persists in modern
times in Latin America* oince the total forces needed in
the New World were very small, the Spanish king could and
did provide them by sending troops from Spain for a tour of
duty in America, after which they might return to Europe.
Few of the Creoles, persons of pure Spanish blood
born in America, had any part in the armed forces in the
colonies for the first two and a half centuries. In the
176o»s colonial militia, officered by Creoles, was organized.
The commissions were sought for the prestige attached to
them however, rather than because of interest in a military
career,* The number of these officers was small, and the
1« Itfle N, McAlister, The "Fuero Militar " in New Spain 1764-
1B0C (Gainesville, University of Florida Press, 1957T*

extent of their ability was generally even smaller. They
were not the leaders in the independence movement, though
some were in subordinate positions, and many remained with
the royalist forces. All who had been In authority during
the wars 9 whether gifted amateurs or those with experience
in the militia, continued to hold and to use power in 1
post-war years, however.
The wars lasted so long that men who had spent all
their adult years participating in the fifteen years of
violence were the ones who were in a position of authority
in the new countries formed from the old Spanish Krapire.
The governments which were established by the end of this
period were authoritarian ones in which centralized power
was controlled by a strong military leader who headed a
personal retinue. Local bosses, supported by similar per-
sonal followers, might control autonomous regions within
the country, iiven the hacendados, the owners of large
estates, maintained private armies, or raised them when
necessary to preserve their control in an area. The power
struggle progressively narrowed down the number of small
armies as one would gain dominance over others in a given
region.
pp. 2*5. There had been some separate companies of
infantry and cavalry, but these were not organised and
zen existed in name on-
2. Charles E. Chapman, "The A&© of Caudillos: A Chapter in
Hispanic American History, The tion of Latin American
Government, ed. Asher N. ChristensenT^ew York: Henry Holt
and Company, 1951)* PP. &5-

By the end of the nineteenth century national armies
had supplanted the lesser groups, and it was no longer
possible for private armies to wrest control from the national
forces. Henceforth, successful revolutions had to have at
least partial support of the national armed forces, 3 Thus
they exercised a predominant influence in the political
fortunes of their nations, though revolutions occurred less
frequently.
The position of supremacy attained by national forces
did not mean much in terms of professional capability.
Military missions from several western countries have been
called upon to help increase the professional competence of
Latin American armed forces in the twentieth century. Since
the beginning of World War II this has been the exclusive
preserve of military missions from the United States, and
there is no indication that their status will change from
the lj$2 position, in which U,3. assistance is given to
almost all of the Latin African republics.
Progress in modernising Latin American armed forces
has been slow. Though a considerable effort to this end
had been made by foreign military missions before World War
II, the condition of the armies they had helped to train
was not sefficiently good to permit them to defend their own
countri^ inst Axis forces. The U,S, Department of State
described the Chilean iirray as being in "deplorable" circum-
stances, t war Department atade a "combat estimate" of the
3, Lieuwen, p, 30.
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Mexican military establishment which concluded that the
Mexican Army was adequate for maintaining internal security
but not for waging a war against a strong opponent , because
of shortages of equipment and lack of training as a team
in the techniques of modern warfare. The Mexican Navy
consisted of a few coastal patrol boats and had become a
separate service only on 1 January 1^40. The state of
Braall*s forces has been described earlier. In sum, the
United States analysts believed that Latin American nations
could do no more than provide for their own internal
security and fend off attacks until U.S. forces could arrive,
that to do this much it was necessary for the U.S. to furnish
arms to these nations, and that the principal defense against
assault would have to be provided by United States forces.
Considerations in 1962 are much the same, though Latin American
armed forces have greatly increased their capabilities. Mill*
tary techniques and equipments throughout the world have
become more sophisticated, and the forces of Latin America
must continue to improve their arms and skill in order to
maintain their relative position or, if possible, better it.
The current capabilities of Latin American armed forces
can only be estimated. Specific information concerning them
is classified. General statements of an official nature
normally avoid any disparaging connotation and therefore give
only a partial evaluation at best. However, an indication of
the increasing ability of the armed forces in the hemisphere
4. Conn and Fairchild, pp. ail, 352, 214.
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is seen in the types of ships and aircraft which they have
acquired and operated over the past few years. Most Latin
American navies are operating vessels built by the United
States for World War II use, which require considerable
talent and training to operate. This applies not Just to
their engineering plants but to rather complicated elec-
tronic equipment and weapons. Modern jet aircraft are not
uncommon among Latin American air forces,
Development relates to changes in the composition
of the armed forces as well as to professional skill with
modern arms. The armies are being modified so that there
are fewer infantry units and artillery batteries and more
engineer battalions. This change is in recognition of the
facts that Latin American armies are not apt to be called
upon so much to fight on the traditional battlefield as to
counter guerrillas, that technical units which can perform
development tasks in peace time are more valuable today
than strictly combat forces, and that improving communica-
tions will increase the effectiveness of the armed forces.
The navies are becoming more concerned with coast guard
functions, and are emphasizing destroyers for A3W operations.
The smaller craft, which were formerly assigned to &SW
patrol duties, are now more likely to be used in anti-
contraband patrols. Air forces tend to operate fewer, but
more modern , fighter planes while increasing the operation of
planes suitable for troop lift and cargo carrying.-*
5. Interview with Lieutenant Commander Oscar Ortega Jugo,
Venezuelan Navy, 7 March 1962, It is recognized that his

12
Some advantages of continuing the development and
modern!*- f the Latin American armed forces may be seen
from an incident involving Costa Rica in 1955. a revolution-
ary group operating from Nicaragua bombed and strafed
several towns as part of an attempted invasion of Costa Rica*
Since the Costa Bican government had no combat aircraft, it
had to make an immediate appeal for assistance. Within four
days the U.S. furnished four P-51 fighter aircraft to Costa
Mea (the U.S. had waited for approval by the Council of the
OAS), and these planes were able to bring about the surrender
of the three plane force of the revolutionaries to Nicaraguan
authorities. Costa Rica still has no military aircraft, and
she was able to get help without much delay, but the planes
did play an important role in the action. The role may be
decisive, and immediate availability of aircraft may be
vital, as the part played by Castro^ planes in breaking up
the abortive invasion of Cuba by counter-revolutionaries in
1961 indicated.
National Military Functions
The need for Latin American armed forces to cope with
threats from within and without, whether Communist inspired
or not, has already bQ<sn discussed in sufficient detail. In
addition to the actual performance which may be anticipated
remarks do not have identical application to all Latin
American countries, but they do indicate a trend, espe-
cially when considered in conjunction with the activity
of U.S. Army School, Port Gulick, and other indications.
6. Mecham, p. 4C4.
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of the armed forces , however, they are of value as a force
in being. Weak states invite attack, and maintenance of
reasonable military strength lessens a possible cause of
strife, though the work of the Organization of American
States also reduces conflicts. The insecurity of nations
which are militarily weak is incompatible with their eco-
nomic development, and that of regional arrangements such
as common markets as well." A nation without military
strength is narrowly circumscribed in its domestic and
foreign policies. Samuel P. Huntington puts it more strongly
when he says that military policy is both domestic policy and
foreign policy— that military policy is the product of the
influences of the domestic and external environments of the
government and of the goals it pursues in those environments.®
Important internal military functions are intelligence
and counter-intelligence. The weeding out of subversive
personnel within the Latin American armed forces is not a
big consideration at this time, it seems, but the capability
to handle this potential problem must be kept current. This
sort of effort is also required as a supplement to police
surveillance of civilian personnel, especially in countries
which have extensive portions of the country that are very
7. Foreign Policy Research Institute of the University of
Pennsylvania, Draper Report , Annex C, p. 50. The basic
ideas of succeeding paragraphs are also touched upon in
this source,
6. Samuel P. Huntington, "Equilibrium and Disequilibrium in
American Military Policy," Political Science Quarterly ,
LXXVI (December 1961), p. HET.
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sparsely settled. Inte nee data concerning these
isolated areas is also needed.
Prestige resulting from military strength is a factor
to be reckoned with in Latin America. This was probably an
important consideration among those which impelled Brazil
to buy an aircraft carrier from Great Britain when she could
not obtain one from the United States, This action doubtless
has had important implications on the military assistance
program for Brazil because it is a departure from the standard-
ization program and because of the heavy expenditure of
foreign exchange which was involved. Still, Argentina was
negotiating for an aircraft carrier at the same time in 1956
>
and the two countries, which have Ions had naval parity, are
contending for leadership in latin America. It is not sur-
prising that Brazil should keep abreast of Argentina in mod-
ernizing its Navy, though the Navy was not prepared to inte-
grate a carrier into the fleet. ^ In this case the U.S. did
not consider the military and prestige factors warranted
making a carrier available to Brazil. A firm stand is often
necessary in order to avoid an arms race or to discourage
expenditures which the U.S. cannot Justify to itself as being
appropriate to its military assistance program. It is evi-
dent, however, that the prestige factor will have to be con-
sidered in conjunction with aid programs, and that enough
flexibility must be Incorporated into the programs to permit
9. The New York Times, December 2, 1956* p. fcj I>ecember 23,
EK, p."T27

delivery of some items out of deference to the prestige
aspirations of the recipients. In many instances, the
maintenance of prestige is part of the over-all stability
and power of a government.
The Armed Forces and Domestic Politics
The active part played by l&tl; -dean armed forces
in domestic politics has been explored, and usually deplored,
at some length by writers in both North and South America.
For the purpose of this study, the important matter is that
the recent actions of the armed forces indicate that they
are becoming more moderate in the exercise of political
influence. It was inevitable that control of government
should be gained and held through force at the time that the
republics were created, but as the Latin American countries
matured, the armed forces became less precipitate and less
direct in exerting influence on government. In times of
anarchy they might impose a government on the country or
limit an existing one, through force, as they have even in
very recent years. This has occurred during periods of
confusion such as were brought on by world depression In
the 193c » s, by dislocations in the post World War II era,
and by breakdown of government where prolonged civil war
has raged. Not all of the Latin American nations matured at
the same rate, and those which are still ruled by dictators
are those which have made the least progress since achieving
independence. However* in most of the republics political
pressure exerted by the armed forces has become relatively
subtle.

Some caution must be exercised in drawing upon recent
events, the story of which may be incomplete, to demonstrate
changes in the amount and kind of political pressure which
the armed forces may bring to bear* Yet the circutastaneea of
the change of government in Brazil and Argentina are of such
importance that even the Tact that the armed forces refrained
from certain types of conduct is reveal!
In Argentina, the events which led to the ouster of
President Frondlzi had their inception at least as early as
two years ago, and the seeds of it were contained in the
Peronist support which was a factor in Sr. Frondizi's elec-
tion in 1956 A coup d'etat has impended throughout this
entire period, but it Is significant that the President and
the leaders of the armed forces had always been able to
reach acceptable compromises and that the single issue which
could not be resolved, and which finally became intolerable,
was the President's failure to give adequate attention to
the preservation of the constitution from the threat of
subversion by Peronist influences. The followers of Peron,
far from being curbed, were given an opportunity to accede
to positions of power within the government when the Presi-
dent authorized the Peronist party to present candidates for
Congressional and gubernatorial seats in March 1962, for
the first time since the party was outlawed in 1999* The
Peronist show of strength in the elections was considered
by the military leaders to constitute so grave a threat to
the constitution, through the possibility of a return to
totalitarian government, that the results must be annulled
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and the President whose actions had brought about these
results must be od incapable of continued tenure of
office.
The chief executive was deposed and arrested, but the
sense of the matter was more nearly that of a motion of cen-
sure, similar to that which would bring about a change of
government in several European democracies under their pre-
sent constitutions* The President was unable to obtain
sufficient support to form a coalition cabinet, so he could
no longer continue to govern. While the military pressure
was undoubtedly a decisive factor, President Frondlsi could
obtain no support from other political factions in making a
cabinet. Instead, they were bitter in their personal attacks
on him and his policies. Attempts to Justify the ouster
action as legal and to suppress the Feronlst faction by
legal means remain a source of trouble, continuing a crisis
which is far from being settled at this writing. However,
there has been no violence, and the argument that to allow
the Peronistas to gain power would be to endanger the
constitution and the government provided by it has some
substance.^
Brazil's crisis occurred when the resignation of
President Quadros in August 1961 meant that executive power
would be assumed by Vice President Goulart, who was too
Leftist in political leaning to suit the leaders of the
i0 » 1£® **®w York Times, March 21, 1962, p. 1; March 23, 1962,
p. l7~ApHT"26, 19o2, p. 1.

Brazilian armed forces. These leaders would not allow
3r, Goulart to assume the Presidency until his power could
be limited by a constitutional amendment providing for a
parliamentary form of government with a reduction in the
power exercised by the President. There were troop movements
which portended civil war, since there were divergent views
among the military leaders themselves, many of whom wished
to uphold the constitution unchanged. However, there were
no actual clashes and Sr. Goulart did accept office as
President under the revised constitution. Dn assuming
office, the President replaced without incident the three
military ministers who had opposed him. These ministers
had acted in the firm belief that such action was necessary
to preserve democracy in Brasil. Ihey had been apprehensive
concerning President Quadros 1 policy of closer relations
with the Communist bloc, yet they had asked Dr. Quadros not
to resign but to give them his reasons for wishing to do so
in order that they might act rightfully within their means
to improve conditions. President ^uadros is quoted as
having expressed his gratitude for the exemplary conduct
11
shown by the armed forces in all circumstances.
John J. Johnson has noted that the armed forces of
Latin America irj general have progressed to the point where,
if they intervene in tsovemment, they act in the name of the
**• *jfo? New York Times , September 1, 19&1, P. 1* September 3#
l^ol, p. I; .September 9* 1^61 , p. 4; September 12, 1961,
p. 14 j September 22, 19ol, p. 32— letter by former
Brazilian ambassador to Britain.

,!«d Threes themselves rather than at the behest of an
individual. Instead of being subservient to a dictator,
the military leaders form a junta in which they share execu-
tive power with civilian ministers in a government which is
acknowledged to be temporary and which often provides for
its own termination by legal means. 12 The military leaders
of Argentina and Brazil seem to have gone one step beyond
this point. They act in concert to press i^or raoderatlon of
certain practices of the Chief Executive by parliamentary
maneuvering rather than by forcible means, and only take
actions which affect the exercise of normal powers on the
part of the President when they come to believe that his use
of power will clearly endanger the constitution.
The influence of the United States military programs
is not clearly demonstrated here. In fact, Argentina has
been reluctant to participate in the hemispheric defense ef-
forts fostered by the United States and has done so only to
a limited extent. Neither can it be said that the actions
of the armed forces were conditioned solely by their profes-
sional military stature. However, the two illustrations
indicate that armed forces which are relatively advanced are
also responsible and relatively restrained, and it is an
implicit aim of the Mutual Security Act that the Latin Ameri-
can armed forces continue to progress with the help of the
12. John J. Johnson, "The latin American Military as a Politi-
cally Competing Group in Transitional Society," The Hole
of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries , ed. ^ohn J.





In order to become modern, the armed forces of Latin
America have had to change their goals, methods, and type of
personnel from those of earlier times. The armed forces have
supported technological progress and modern industry, and
have been strong advocates of improved transportation and
communication facilities, since the latter half of the
nineteenth century. The military academies were founded at
rather early dates in several of the Latin American countries,
and they were oriented toward education in science. In
modern times the armed forces have tended to identify them-
selves closely with industry. They don*t like to be depend-
ent on other countries for industrial products, so they
encourage industrial development at home. The officers have
13. -dor also had a serious crisis which resulted in the
resignation of the President and the installation of the
Vice President as Chief Executive. lUoting by civilian
;>ups over tax increases, lack of action to rehabilitate
the south, and the killing of rioting students brought
about divided loyalties and fighting between military
units over support of the President. The chiefs of staff
are reported to have told President Velasco Ibarra that
they could no longer defend his Presidency and to have
obtained his promise to resign. Though the revolt was
originally civilian in character, it was the Air Force
which was decisive in supporting the Vice President,
whom Congress voted to fill the vacant office, against
the Army's choice, the President of the Supreme Court.
(The New York Times , November 5, 1961, p. 42; November
S7"T9oT7 p. 1; November 10, 19ol, p. 1.) Ecuador has a
history of tumult that has subsided only very slowly over
the years since independence. In this instance, loss of
life was low, order was restored without great difficulty,
and the people backed the present incumbent against part




-lis that are rare in their countries, so they fill many
lit
top positions in industry. Military leaders are sensitive
to the economic and technical development of their countries
because this constitutes the basis for survival in rivalry
with other nations.
An educated and capable officer corps is only a
starting point for a modern military force,, however. The
men they lead must acquire basic skills so that they can be
trained to use the modern equipment with which they are
armed and to provide the support services which a modern
force must have. The extent to which this occurs may be
seen from the evolution of United States forces. In 1934
only 28.8 per cent of U.S. Army enlisted personnel were
ensa^ed in purely military occupations as compared with 93*2
per cent at the time of the Civil War. The same pattern
holds for the officer group and to an even greater extent
for both the Navy and the Air Force. The civilian type
occupations which U.S. military personnel now perform are
those of technical, scientific, clerical, administrative,




In underdeveloped countries, making a good soldier
means training a man in modern skills. In this effort, the
armed forces are more thorough and more comprehensive than
14. J;hnson, "The Latin American Military," pp.
15. Pye. p. 1^7.
16. Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier , A Social ana




are civilian agencies, since military diaeipli .d training
orders all activities of those who are members. The
focus is on skills, but literacy is itself an important
fundamental skill. The modern i,. . process is »arupt2
one, since the recruits are exposed, to many influences for
the first titae, including ite
.3 well as classroom exper ia. Yet
the armed forces provide re© of psychoid
security which permits these drastic changes to be accom-
modated more readily by fch* individual. Civilians Ml
experience a similar uprooting, as by moving from ti juntry
to an arban aluai, tend to become extremists in their search
for security. People in the armed forces have at least some
degree of social mobility and b&j advance on the basis
merit rather than of circumstances of birth. It is important
too that the training in basic education and in citizenship
are carried over to civilian life when the individuals
complete their military service. The veterans are more apt
to have political influence than they did before entering
the service. Furthermore , they have a better re .tion
of the responsibilities of nationalism, an appreciation of
the sacrifices involved if political slogans are to be made
effective.
^
Teaching the military men to be literate need not
involve much expenditure for classrooms and instructors.
work of this type is carried on by radio in many placos in
17. i5ye, pp. 15C-156.

Latin America. In Colombia, the government has made arrange-
ments so that the army men may follow the radio school,
Accion Cultural Popular, which conducts a special school
for the armed forces. In an organization which is about
6c per cent illiterate, this training is important. 10 It
could be given impetus in Colombia and elsewhere by making
various degrees of literacy a requirement for advancement.
The training could be continued after active service has
been completed by the establishment of incentive through a
paid military reserve. There are undoubtedly agencies that
are better equipped than the armed forces to teach literacy
skills, but the armed forces are probably in the best
position to give men the time and purpose for participation
in a literacy program.
Teaching men to read and write is a most valuable
contribution to citizenship in itself, but in addition it
opens up many avenues for civic advancement of the individ-
uals in the military service. In many republics, it is a
requisite for making them eligible for voting and for
increased participation in national politics. It enables
them to become more familiar with the history of their
country and current happenings in it. In many cases, these
subjects are dealt with as part of the process of learning
to be literate.
. Jjhn J. Consldine, New Horizons in Latin America (Hew
York: Dodd, Mead & Company, '1^77 p7T26.
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Military service has some other effects which broaden
and educate the individuals and which act to better their
life as civilians on completion of service. Much depends on
the background of the individual, of course, since men from
urban areas will have experienced at least some of the effects
to a greater degree than those from rural areas, Life in a
large and ordered community of men, subject to discipline and
law which upholds rights as well as duties, and in which the
observance of higher standards of dress, hygiene, and personal
care is required, may represent a very marked change from
former conditions for a great many of the men in service.
Some may become acquainted with safety procedures applicable
to their civilian pursuits, Some will be benefited by medi-
cal care. Travel and service In areas of the country outside
their usual locality modifies the regional viewpoint which
many Latin American men possess, A greater civic awareness
and capability should result from military service for most
of the men in Latin America who participate in it.
The armed forces can be important in supplementing a
country's public works program. The Mexican Army builds bar-
racks, schools, and hospitals, manages reforestation and ir-
rigation projects, and helps keep the roads repaired. In
Brazil, the army explored the interior, set up communications
lines, developed agricultural colonies, and helped the
Indians to advance in civilization. The Peruvian and Bolivian
Armies had similar tasks in the 194c 1 6 and 1930* s respectively.
ly. Lieuwen, pp, 116 and 13^.

Peru is still having road construction done by an Army unit,
now equipped with modern roadbuilding machinery through the
Mutual Security Program and organized as a Construction
.ineerin^ Battalion. The project of constructing a trans-
Andean highway was speeded by flying some of the machinery
to the eastern terminal of the road in chartered planes so
that work could proceed simultaneously from both ends of
the proposed road. c In labor surplus areas, the equipment
need not be complex nor essentially labor-saving devices.
k comprehensive listing of the 1959 activities of
the military in undertakings of a civic nature in Latin
21
America is given in the Draper Report
.
3o«aetimes the
armed forces, particularly the armies, are almost completely
self-sufficient economic groups, raising their own food and
operating factories which produce clothing and utensils.
Competition with the civilian economy in these matters Is
not desirable as a general rule. However, insofar as such
activities teach trades and modern methods, and especially
where colonization of an unoccupied area is concerned, they
are beneficial. It is, of course, undesirable that non-
military activities detract from military capability and
availability, but an appropriate balance can be maintained
by continuous supervision.
20 • <r*ie New York Times , June 25, I961, sec. IV, p. 9j and
August 13, 1961, sec. VI, p. 11.
21. Brig. Gen. Donald 0. Shingler, "Contributions of
Military Resources to Economic and Social Progress,"
Draper Report, Annex D, pp. 95-126.

Probably the armed forces of latin Amftrlc ke their
greatest contribution through engineering surveys rather than
through actual construction or participation in economic
activity. In many cases survey work cannot be performed
except by groups under military discipline and with the
incentive of military ends to be served as well as non -mili-
tary benefits which accrue from the work. In the United
States, the U.S. Army Engineers still have responsibility
for river navigation and flood control. In latin America,
water conservation and irrigation projects may be even more
important and can be undertaken at the same time by compar-
able units. The navies can do similar work in connection
with hydrographic surveys and port development. Air forces
do much aerial photography for map making and exploration.
another group of military activities which is not in
competition with civilian occupations is in the realm of
sanitation, epidemic control, and medical care and research.
In isolated areas, these are not apt to be practiced except
by military units, and even the municipal governments may
not be well organized to cope with problems in these fields
and may therefore welcome assistance from the armed forces.
Actually, there are a great many non-military func-
tions which the armed forces could and do perform. These
abilities may be very useful in emergencies, and emergencies
arise with gitt&t frequency in latin America because the
civilian economy is not so well developed as to cover many
activities in depth or offer alternate courses of action.

Thus even the use of military trucks and labor to save a
crop Is much more important to some Latin American countries
than it would be to the United 3tates. There are many
other activities further up the technological scale which
may have important use in emergencies.
U.S. military personnel are not assigned to latin
America in sufficient number to provide field assistance
to these activities except in a limited advisory capacity.
They can and do help to train members of the latin American
armed forces to acquire the necessary fundamental skills.
There is a great need for the state to perform
various tasks in connection with basic industries in Latin
America, This condition arises because the Latin American
nations wish to operate their own utility and transportation
companies, and because it is very difficult to build and
operate these facilities at a profit due to public resistance
to the setting of rates at appropriate levels. In addition,
these industries require a very large capitalization which
often is obtainable only through Inter-governmental arrange-
ments. The industries no longer attract foreign private
capital, and the public in Latin America has lost confidence
in the utilities as an area of private investment. As a
result, the ownership of public utilities has tended to pass
from private to public hands. 22 Often the politicians and
the civil service employees are reluctant to assume hi^h
22. John J. Johnson, Political Change in Latin ximerica: The
argence of the Middle Sectorg ( Stanford ; Stanford
UniversityTress , "T§3HJ, pp. IB7-l£

positions in these industries because of the public's
adverse reaction to failures of service, difficulties in
setting rates, or labor problems which arise* Thus, military
officers, who are less affected by these considerations and
who have the requisite technical training, often are placed
in positions of leadership in industry. The Alliance for
Progress aiay require that this become even more common,
because many of the projects which will be submitted under
this program hinge upon adequate power and communications
facilities.
The armed forces pervade the political and economic
life of Latin America to a considerable extent, in addition
to fulfilling the normal military role. In some of the state-
operated industries, their influence may increase in an
effort to give these industries stability and adequate
managerial talent. Military influence may increase also
in the development of relatively Isolated areas as the
tfeillty of the armed forces to perform some of the desired
civic activities is augmented. In other sectors of the
national life, the influence of the military leaders is
being constrained by tne growth of other powerful groups,
by the increasing complexity of certain non-military pursuits,
and by the professional requirements of their services. The
modernizing and professionalizing of the Latin American armed
forces have been achieved at least in part and they have had
several observable effects. The extent to which these proc-
esses may be attributable directly to the Influence of U.S.

military pi' -annot fc , but surely it would





The role which the Latin American armed forces pi.
in support of the Organisation or American States and the
United Nations may be influential in determining the char-
acter of these forces now and in the future,
9 military forces of Latin America made a start
toward professionalism when it became necessary for them to
assume a role as protectors of the national boundaries— when
nationalistic sentiments within the republics made expansion
a fact and the need for protection a reality. The armed
forces gained additional importance through support of
national policies when the Latin American nations came to
be accepted into the world community about 1905- About this
date the Latin American republics were invited to participate
in a conference of world powers for the first time— the
Second Hague Peace Conference. The trend toward enhanced
prestige for the armed forces continue 1 was intensified
oj participation in World War XI. In the meantime , the
development of arbitration procedures in the hemisphere had
reached the point of reducing to some extent the importance
of the armed forces as bulwarks of nationalism. Offsetting
this trend, the development o£ Internationa .tlons
has made the possession of modern armed forces a means of
90

acquirir, i itus within the organizations. Many of the
functions which the armed forces of Latin America are now
carrying out, a'. robably should be expanded in the
national interests of Latin V erica, contribute to technician,
or concern with technical specialties, in the armed forces,
and continued participation in political and economic life
by the officers. If these officers now concern themselves
more fully with the probable requirements of hemispheric
defense and of the international organizations, trends toward
professionalism, and therefore away from technician and
politics, will be accentuated. 1
The Organisation of American States
The is very much concerned with maintenance of
peace in the hemisphere through non-intervention and peaceful
settlement of disputes. In this, it rests on a history of
more than fifty years of development, through declarations
and resolutions, of the principles which were Ineorporat
in the Charter of the 3A3. However, continental rlty
requirements dictate that the charter also contain provisions
for the use of force and limitations on that use, both as a
means of insuring that the peaceful settlement procedures
would be used and to counter ossion in the hemisphere.
1. The reasoning of this paragraph, and the meaning placed on
the terms, follow those of Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier
and the state (Cambridge s The Belknap Press of Harvard
University, 1957). The entire book concerns itself with
this general subject, but the discussion of the U.S. armed
forces on j 232 epitomizes the theme. Profession is
contrasted with craft, not amateur status, and is practiced
by the officers rather than the enlisted men, who are
specialists in the application but not the management of
violence. Cf . pp. 7-1& and 195-203.

At first, the measures to deal with aggression con-
templated acts initiated by non-American states. It was
agreed in a Meeting of Consultation of Foreign Ministers at
Havana in 194c, that an act of aggression by a non-American
state against an American state would be considered an act
of aggression against all the American states* The Act of
Chapultepec in 1945 extended the scope by applying the
principle to any aggressor states, including American repub-
lics. Application of the principal to the Axis powers in
World war II has already been described. The response to
the threat posed by the Axis powers was mostly through
bilateral treaties between the United States and the several
republics of Latin America. U.£. strength was a necessary
element in the success of essential undertakings in defense
of the hemisphere. Hence the U.S. entered into a^eements
with several Individual republics for defense preparations
or for furthering the offensive operations in Africa and
Europe.
The bilateral arrangements, like the Havana resolution
itself, were brought about by the pressures of events and
were improvised to cope with specific situations, A whole
body of policies and procedures evolved through improvisa-
tion as the war progressed. The method proved to be effec-
tive in meeting the problems of the war, but a more formal
system might have been even more effective, through forehanded-
ness, had it been devised before the outbreak of World War II.
As it was, the experiences of the war resulted in the growth

i Latin American demand Tor the development of a hemi-
spheric security system which would be effective for the
postwar period, 2
There was general agreement that inter-American pro-
blems should continue to be primarily the responsibility of
the American states acting through a regional organisation.
Planning along these lines had been started as early as 1942,
The inter-American system had given to Latin American repub-
lics a parity with the most powerful nation in the free
world, insofar as decisions respecting hemisphere affairs
were concerned, and the Charter of the OAS continues this
juridical equality.
3
The Charter could not give equality in military
matters however, nor does it require of any country that it
maintain armed forces. It continues the obligations agreed
upon in the Rio de Janeiro Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance
of 1947 that the American states take positive action to
neat an armed attack within the hemisphere, and that they
act after consultation in cases of armed attack outside the
hemisphere in which a member state is involved. However, no
state is required to use armed force unless it consents to
do so, and then only in implementation of a decision by two-
thirds of the signatories in favor of imposing force as a
a
sanction. Still, the Charter rests on the assumption that
armed forces will be available to enforce the collective will,
2. Mecham, p. 245,
3. Mecham, pp. 249-2 .
4. Mecham, pp. 282-284,

Individual nations call on the IAS for military assistance,
as Cjoui Rica did when it was invaded from Nicaragua in 1955
*
confidence that the nations which are known to have the
requisite military strength will make it available under
these circumstances.
While the Charter of the OhS does not require that
any state maintain armed forces, it does invite maintenance
fore ijre they exist. It does so through the continua-
tion of the Inter-American Defense Board and the establishment
of an Advisory Defense Committee as subordinate elements to
the organ of consultation of the 0A3, The latter has never
developed beyond the paper stage because the Defense Board
itself seems to fulfill current military needs of the OAS.
Board has no armed forces under its direct control; it
is a planning board only. Its present plans are realistic in
their recognition that Latin America is a "secondary opuce"
where direct attack by Communist forces is unlikely, several
vital, though smaller scale, functions remain, and furnishing
of troops is not excluded, so planning by the Board is neces-
sary if effectiveness in carrying out these functions is to
be achieved, standardisation of weapons and training are
Board recommendations which, were adopted when the provisions
of the Mutual Security Act were extended to include Latin
America.
5
The Inter-American l>efense Board is active in terms of
meetings, inspection tours, etc., but it has not produced
5. Mecham, pp. 329-334.

uhat has ©. Lcantly changed the current hemi-
sphere defense arra enta. 2fte Annu* I Pt of the
Secretary General of the OAS for i960 related that- the
Council of Delegates or the Board had held 35 meetings and
13 assemblies during the year* The report also indicated
that one of the projects worked on by the Board was a study
of collective aerial defense, studies such as this
lead the American States toward assignment of forces to
the GAS eventually, and hence to an operational role for
the Defense Board. At the present time, the principal
values o^ the Board are in making collaboration in Joint
defence easier through personal contact among military
leaders of 19 nations, and in encouraging a more professional
attitude among Latin American military personnel."
Hemispheric defense continues to be founded on bi-
lateral agreements, though it is now expected to counter
aggression from any source. There are several short-run
advantages of speed, flexibility, and independence gained
from the use of bilateral agreements. However, there are
also some long-run disadvantages inherent in the system of
bilateral relations, principally through friction among Latin
6. Organization of American States, 196c Annual Report of the
Secretary General to the Council of
'
fhaTgrganl^atlon
(Washington, D. C, 13&T), p. 101.
7. U.S., Congress, Senate, Subcommittee on American Republics
Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, "The
Organisation of American States," Study no, 3* United
States -Latin A erican Relations, Document no 12$, Both
Cong., 2d Sess., 1^60, p. 21b. Costa rtica no longer sends
delegates and Cuba has been barred from participation.

American republics and through arousing nationalistic
impulses which are directed against the United States.
Increased use of the OAS would ameliorate some of these
difficulties. Still, care must be taken that the 0A5 is not
overloaded and that the U.S. does not dominate the Organisa-
tion, upsetting the existing balance of national influence
within it.
Strengthening hemispheric military capability within
the GAS might best be done through the Inter-American Defense
Board. Three proposals to accomplish this have been made.
1) The Board could furnish the membership for the Advisory
Defense Committee and also such attache services as may be
needed for investIgatory committees established by the
Council, when it acts as an organ of consultation, and by
the Inter-American Peace Committee. This course would permit
the members of the Defense Board to share in the underlying
tasks of war prevention through the OAS rather than to be
isolated from them. 2) A small (ICC man) force operated by
the Defense Board at the command of the OAS Council to supple-
ment the national forces of a threatened republic could serve
as a starting point for gradual reduction of national forces
by relieving them of some security duties* 3) establishment
of an inter-American staff college and mission unit to be
operated by the Inter-American Defense Board, would intensify
the present educational activity of the Board and further
the profeasionallsatlon of the Latin American military
officers."
itudy No. 3, senate Doc No. 125, pp. 23&-243.
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Expansion of the functions of the Inter-American
Defense Board would, In all probability, require some char,
in the Charter of the 0A3. Certainly this would be true if
U.S. military aid were to be channeled through the OkS, as
some U.S. Con&ressoien have proposed. Even though the forces
now being trained and equipped with U.S. help under bilateral
treaties can be used in joint efforts to counter aggression,
some advantages would accrue from giving military assistance
to the 0A3 for further distribution.^ However, the American
states do not seem to be ready to accept major changes to
the Charter. Besides, increased use of the OAS for military
purposes should be concurrent with increased reliance on the
Organisation to implement other policies which affect ail or
most of the American republics. Otherwise, the social and
economic functions of the OAS may be submerged. The United
states has not shown ^reat disposition to act through the
OkS in any of these areas. U.S. aircraft carrier task force
patrols off the Dominican Republic in 1^6lic represent
continuance of unilateral action in Latin America and bi-
lateral relations with latin countries. Continued bypassing
of the OAS will hinder tendencies to strengthen it and may
ultimately jeopardize its existence, so it would seem that
the U.S. should make an effort to operate through the Organisa-
tion to the extent that this Is feasible.
$• U.3., Congress, senate, Committee on Foreign Relations,
Hearings to Amend the Mutual Security Act of 195^, 86th
Con ., 2d Sees., 1^00, p. 352.





j tIons arid expressions of the Latin American repub-
lics at the Meeting or Consultation of Foreign Ministers at
£unta del £ste, Uruguay early in 1962, A major cause or the
inability of the American nations to agree unanimously on
the expulsion of Cuba fro© the 0AS was due to concern over
the legality of the proceedings, since the Charter made no
provision for expulsion. Some fear was expressed that lack
of unanimity imperiled the continued effectiveness of the
Organization. The U.S. view, on the other hand, was that
the ability to arrive at a majority opinion was more indica-
tive of strength than would be a unanimous stand which
suppressed opposing views . Still j the difficulties
experienced in reaching a consensus indicate that the
is not well equipped to deal with such problems. This points
to a danger that the Organisation will increasingly be bypassed,
unless steps to strengthen it are initiated.
Latin America and the United Nations
Preservation of the inter-American security system
has been a primary goal of the Latin American republics for
many years. It caused them to lead the movement to retain
autonomous regional organization© within the UN while
recognizing the paramount authority of the United Nations
for the enforcement of actions to preserve peace. The
Dumbarton Oaks proposals had seemed incompatible with the
provisions of the Act of Chapultepee for the use of force
11. The New York Times, February 3, 1962, p. 2,

to meet aggression in the western hemisphere. The former
specifically stated that "no enforcement action should be
taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies
without the authorization of the Security Council," Unless
the Dumbarton Oaks proposals were modified, the Inter-Ameri-
can system, which had acquired world-wide respect and pres-
tige, would have been made subject to a UN veto, and the
Latin American nations objected strongly to this condition,
compromise was reached whereby the inherent rl^ht of
states to take Individual or collective action in self-
defense was not impaired by the Charter of the UN, nor was
the authority and responsibility of the Security Council to
take necessary action affected by the exercise of the ri^ht
of self-defense, Senator Vandenberg provided this formula
to accommodate the Latin American view, which had been force-
fully presented to the U.S. delegates in informal gatherings
at the United Nations Conference at San Francisco,
Hie inter-American security system thus was integrated
into the United Nations, Nevertheless, its freedom of action
is subjected to certain limitations. The Oas can take no
enforcement action on its own initiative, except in case of
self-defense, but must obtain authorization from the
Security Council. The Security Council must be kept informed
of disputes arising in the hemisphere and of action taken
respecting them. The Council can intervene to act for itself,
but would be expected to do so only if the GAS were ineffec-
tive. And a dispute may be taken directly to the Council

without reference to the Oxs, Thus far, the veto power of
the permanent members of the Security Council has not affected
enforcement action in the hemisphere, but the possibility
remains that the veto may be used to this end. In order to
remain autonomous, the 0A3 will have to continue development
of its peaceful settlement procedures and also its means of
insuring that these procedures are used and respected. 1S
The OAS and the United Nations have many similarities
— in their basic structure, their exercise of similar func-
tions, and in their pursuit of several Identical purposes.
Some differences arise out of their dissimilar origins and
scope. The regional organisation has a long history of
development of procedures well suited to the continent. Hie
universal organization is newer and is still devising methods
for coping with world problems, for which purpose it has also
developed organs not found in the OAS. ^
The United Nations, like the 0A3, expects its members
to contribute such military power as is necessary to accomplish
the desired ends of preserving peace. The obligation is to
be interpreted by each sovereign nation as it sees fit, but
all the republics of the Western Hemisphere are cognizant of
it. That only one Latin American nation contributed armed
forces to the UN forces in Korea has been cited as indicative
of a narrow view of hemisphere defense."4, actually, several
12. Mecham, pp. 246-277.
13 • Manuel Canyes, The organisation of American otates and the
United Nations (4th ea.j Washington, £).' £. ," Pari "American
Union, 195$), p. 18.
14, Lieuwen, pp. 209-210.

countries offered small cont. ts, often volunteers, Tor
service In Korea, but these were not accepted because the
United States had decided that units numbering less than
1000 could not be employed effectively. Many also offered
foodstuffs, materials, and eash. 1^ In modem warfare, even
of the police type, troops with a considerably greater
level of training than would be expected of volunteer groups
are apt to be roughly handled Colombia, for instance,
furnished an Infantry battalion for combat duty in Korea,
and it suffered heavy casualties.
In 1951* U.S. Congressmen expressed disappointment
at the small scope of Latin American participation In the
Korean War. The Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-
Aaerican Affairs remainded them that the equipment of the
Latin American countries was not in good enough condition
to prepare them for modern warfare. He pointed out that "if
we look to the countries of Latin America to help us in con-
nection with an operation such as Korea, then we must be pre-
pared to look at the state of readiness of their armed forces."
He added that the cost of maintaining forces in Korea was a
difficult problem for many of the Latin American nations. The
United States, readying itself for the Korean action, could
do little to furnish funds, equipment, or spare parts to
Latin America. 1" These conditions are reminiscent of those
15. Mecham, pp. 430-431.
16. U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations
Hearings on Mutual Security Act of 1951 # B2d Cong., 1st
Sess., 1951, ppr39^r

which existed at the beginning I ^rld War II, Certainly
the Latin African republics are better prepared today to
furnish forces if the UN should need theta. The willingness
of these countries to participate in UN affairs can perhaps
be determined only by a showdown in the event of a crisis
which requires cooperation of this sort. For the present,
at least, there seems to be little reason to doubt that
Latin America will respond as promptly as in the past and





In discussing the ,-neric a I forces and the
cooperative efforts by the United States which contributed
to the attainment of their present status, it is easy to
lose sight of the fact that many of the conditions were the
result of rather radical changes introduced quite recently.
The seriousness o£ the Nazi threat to the hemisphere, only
twenty-two years ago, caused the United States to enter into
close military relations with Latin American nations for the
first time in its history. The sending of Brazilian combat
troops to Italy Mai the first participation of this kind in
an overseas campaign by any latin American republic.
1
The newness of U,S« military cooperation with latin
America makes judgment of results difficult enough, but lack
of continuity in it makes assessment harder still. Had the
assistance efforts been uninterrupted, U.S. influence sight
have had a nvore favorable political effect. The years fr.
1/45 to 1952, during which the U.S. ceased to furnish mili-
tary assistance to Latin America on a scale which approached
that of the years before and after that time, was the period
when some military leaders in Latin America made their prepara-
tions for accession to power, resulting in some of the most




odious dictatorships experienced by their countries* There
are, of course, many other factors which permitted their
ascendency. It is worth noting, also, that these dictators
were superseded in the years after U.S. military assistance
was resumed in some of these countries, and that the least
which might fee said is that U.S. aid did not prevent their
demise
.
In fact, the U.S. has come to take an active part in
fostering social reform in Latin America, and the Alliance
for Progress is indicative of this trend. The military
assistance programs seem to be consistent with this aim*
Some of the pressure for social change, as well as support
for it, comes in part from the citizens whose horizons have
been broadened by education received while in the military
service* 3ome of the support comes also from officers who
have developed interests which are more professional and less
political. In both cases, U.S. military assistance is a
contributory factor. To this extent it has prepared the way
for, and should now work toward the success of, the more
inclusive Alliance for Progress.
The Latin American republics have frequently been told
that they were not recipients of a larger share of aid funds
disbursed by the U.3. in prior years because they did not
need programs such as the Marshall Plan— that U.S. expendi-
tures in Europe and Asia achieved results which contributed
to Latin American security as well as to that of the United
States. Now the conditions are almost reversed— Europe is
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prosperous and stable and Communist incursions there have
been halted, while the Latin American economy is suffering
and Communism has intruded its influence into the hemisphere.
This intrusion requires that military preparedness— among
other things— be maintained at a high level in order to
counter the expansionist tendencies of Communism, It seems
that, as a minimum, flexibility of military action should be
increased by removing the present ceiling on the amount which
may be expended on military assistance to Latin America,
There seems to be little likelihood that reversal of condi-
tions will be complete— that the hemisphere, rather than
Europe, will have first call on the wealth and military
Strength of the United States— but events may cause a sizable
increase in the proportion of military and economic aid dis-
tributed to Latin America.
An increase in expenditures is not a necessary nor an
automatic response to removal of a ceiling on them, though it
is a likely result. More to the point is a Judgment as to
whether or not military aid should be intentionally increased
as a means of expanding the social and civic effects oC the
military services, k large number of the more vocal and
influential groups in Latin America have an aversion for the
United States, unwarranted, in the eyes of many Americans, but
present. They are able to block some of the programs which
are being worked out under the Alliance for Progress and which
are already so late in starting that they may be inadequate
neet minimum needs by the time they get moving. Expansion
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of military assistance is rather easy and rapid, and meets
little opposition. The armed forces have the supervisory
organization, often better disciplined and more accountable
than those of other government agencies, the manpower pool,
arid expansible projects of civic betterment which are already
under way in some cases. This may not be the most efficient
way possible to £»et interim programs going* but in some areas
it may be the most efficient method immediately available.
Increasing aid in this way is subject to limitation, however,
by the fact that bilateral treaties have been made with only
twelve republics.
Extension of the Mutual Security Act to include nations
which do not now have bilateral agreements with the U.S.
might be desirable, but it might simply add complications if
the attempt were made to negotiate such agreements at the
same time that the Alliance for Progress is getting started.
In the absence of such agreements, however, it would seem
advantageous to achieve the same ends through an expansion
of the military planning and liaison functions of the GAS,
with a view to channeling some assistance to individual
countries through that body eventually.
If the solution of Latin American questions increasingly
will involve the OAS, preliminary steps to strengthen the
Organisation, with provisions for continued growth, should be
initiated. A complete discussion o£ the possibilities for
expanding the involves much more than military programs,
but these must be given consideration also. Fulfillment of

the aims of the Alliance for Progress will undoubtedly result
in competition for the funds which the Latin American repub-
lics currently authorize for the support of their military
establishments. At the same time, greater collaboration
between the armed forces and civilian agencies probably will
be sought, particularly insofar as projects which add to
basic capabilities of the nations are concerned, projects
such as port development or pipeline construction. Increased
military cooperation within the 0a3 can contribute to the
acceptability of both competitive and collaborative processes.
As the Latin American armed forces become more modern-
ized and more deeply committed to joint defense, economies may
be effected through division of labor and siiarlng of instal-
lations within a Joint military organization. NATO provides
an example which, while vastly different from the Latin
American situation in many basic aspects, offers some prece-
dents which may be applicable to the 0A3. w:uite obviously,
these precedents need not be adopted without modification,
and the situation in the hemisphere is not so pressing, as to
require a rapid shift to agencies and policies which NATO
has found desirable for its purposes. Nevertheless, the
experiences of NATO in its evolution would seem to have
meaning for the OAS which has not yet been reflected in its
organization or in the uses made of that body.
Earlier chapters have indicated that U.S. military
programs, as they apply to latin America, have not been very
large nor comprehensive. There has not heen widespread

?ement, either In the United states or in the Latin Ameri-
can republics, as to the need for or the content of these
programs , much less a sense of urgency in connection 'with
the threats these programs are intended to counter. Communist
inroads in the hemisphere and the existence of social and
economic conditions which foster receptivity to Communist
influence are readily recognised, but the emphasis is on
political and financial action rather than readying armed
forces for more extensive efforts to overcome these condi-
tions, or the potential situations which they may evoke.
One can hardly ar&ue that the financial measures now
in pro&ress should be restrained out of consideration for
the desirability of integrating them through the OAS. They
are not very large in scale, nor are they proceeding rapidly,
and they seem belated even now. Yet expansion of the Alliance
for Progress seems inevitable, and with this expansion will
arise some problems which are of a joint nature, such as
development of rivers which form the boundary between two
republics or economic issues involving a customs union. The
air of crisis which now surrounds much of the activity under-
taken in implementation of the Alliance for Progress indicates
the desirability of early negotiation within the GAS of as
many incipient problems as lend themselves to resolution by
that body. Certainly this is true for problems which are
primarily military, but it is also appropriate to many efforts
of a public works nature which have military implications in
some measure.

Cooperation in a Joint military venture increases the
sense of hemispheric solidarity, as was the case for Latin
American participants in World War II and in the Korean War.
In fact, some analysts believe that the U.S., though techni-
cally correct, erred in not enhancing solidarity by accept-
ing Latin American units for service in these actions, no
matter how small or limited. In peacetime, the only equiva-
lent means of achieving community of interest through exist-
ing organizations is in the Inter-American Defense Board.
The Board has done much of its work in peripheral areas
because the principal cooperative military effort, that
involving the U.S., has been conducted through bilateral
treaties. This is not an unalterable condition. The Board
has worked harmoniously for several years, and there seems
to be no serious impediment to growth in the area of training
and coordination of logistic support. Such a development
would enhance the Board's responsibilities, and hence prestige,
but would not entail command functions, which some countries
are reluctant to entrust to the 3oard. NATO has found it
necessary to take this last step too, and it may be that the
OAo will feel a similar need at some future date. If the
.Defense Board were allowed to gain additional experience
through handling more peace time functions, it would make
the transition to command an easier one.
Standardization of arms and training is an aim that
both the GAS and NATO are already pursuing but inter-organisa-
tion cooperation in these matters could be fruitful, especially
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since some Latin American countries already have some
European equipment, A proposal for a War College adminis-
tered by the QA3, probably resembling the NATO Defense
College, has already been mentioned. Cooperation in techni-
cal agencies, such as NATO's advisory Group for Aeronautical
Research and Development or its signals agencies, would be a
logical development. Nore intensive study of the NATO
command organization and the NATO common infrastructure
might subsequently be very beneficial to the DAS. United
States officers with NATO experience would be available for
assistance if the 0A3 were to organise along these lines at
some future time. However, if arrangements were made for
the Inter-American Defense Board to assign observers (or
perhaps operating personnel) to the NATO staff now, the Board
would gain in insight and in its experience level.
Participation in NATO would result in a better appre-
ciation by Latin America of the world-wide commitments of
the U.S. The Latin American governments have perhaps been
overly concerned with a restricted, merely regional outlook.
Debates and diplomatic contact in the United Nations and the
OAS are forums in which Latin America becomes acquainted with
U.i>. world interests. However, close contact with a body
which actually has a voice in evaluating and determining the
U.S. military force levels and expenditures in Europe would
give the Latin American governments a more convincing picture
of the extent of U.S. security efforts. Meanin^ul inter-
national policies must be world policies, in which regional
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Anizations have an appropriate part. At present, this
is more descriptive of U.S. policy than it is of the interests
of the Latin American republics.
If the opposite course were adopted— if latin American
armed forces were greatly reduced or if their role in hemi-
sphere defense were downgraded considerably, hemispheric
solidarity would probably suffer. If the republics of latin
America were relieved of responsibilities, they would lose
contact with the realities of defense requirements, and
therefore become impatient with the U.S. in these matters.
One of the current causes of U. 3. -Latin *raerlcan misunder-
standing in economic and political matters is a lack of
realism in the Latin American concepts of U.S. involvement
in these areas. It would seem most undesirable to diminish
understanding of the facts behind common defense under present
conditions.
If neither expansion nor contraction of the role of
the OAS, and consequently of the Inter-American Defense Board,
is likely, there is still the possibility that the Board as
presently constituted could do more, such as prepare and
supervise combined exercises with existing national forces.
In the past, most exercises involving more than one country
have been those connected with the visits of U.S. naval
forces, composed of one or more submarines and several
2. According to current usage, combined operations are those
involving the forces of two or more nations, while joint




vessels, which made annual cruises for the purpose of operat-
ing with the ASw" forces of as many Latin American countries
in succession as possible. The duration of these cruises
varied, depending on the over-all commitments of U.S. naval
forces. The exercises seemed to be very productive and to
have been well received by the participating countries, but
such limited efforts could hardly be considered sufficient
to meet the training needs of Latin American forces. Natural-
ly these nations conducted training within their own forces.
However, combined exercises can help to fulfill the require-
ments for more advanced training of these forces, augmenting
their experience, and they also expose, for subsequent solu-
tion, some of the problems which operations of this nature
usually evoke.
The sharing of services between neighboring states,
such as the operation of Colombian ASW vessels with Venezuelan
submarines, is a type of activity which can be expanded. Co-
operation of this sort does not necessarily require the
services of the Inter-American Defense Board, but to act
through the Board allows the accrual of some advantages of
the sort mentioned in the case of more comprehensive combined
exercises. The forces available to r.any latin American
nations are relatively small, and the experience of their
senior officers is correspondingly limited. Rotation
through planning and logistics bodies which might be estab-
lished within the Defense Board to coordinate sharing arrange-
ments would broaden the experience of many officers, and their
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prestige as well. To the extent that wider experience would
be reflected in more realism In planning, the current functions
of the Board would be snore capably performed.
It is possible, of course, that the U.S. might be able
to increase Its participation in combined exercises. How-
ever, the U.S. is heavily committed in other geographic areas
as well as in its own training efforts. Besides, there is
no assurance that more widespread U.S. Involvement would
serve the purpose of improving Latin American training as
well as would acceleration and coordination efforts made
by the Latin Americans themselves. Among the criticisms of
U.S. military policies in the past has been a persistent and
frequently voiced belief that the U.S. tutelage is excessive.
Much of what has been said here would suggest, then,
that the United States should continue its military programs
in Latin America, and that it should be willing to expand
them in a manner consistent with the requirements which the
evolution of the organizational and professional capabilities
of the Latin American republics, both individually and as a
group, generates. There seems to be no need for a crash
program of any sort, nor any way to accommodate one if it
were begun. There does seem to be ample room for continued
growth of U.S. aid to Latin American military development.
The process of building up the Latin American armed
forces, not only in strength but in modernity of equipment
and outlook, has been sketched in previous chapters. It has
been attended by fairly sizable expenditures of money and

effort on the part of the United States, but also by frustra-
tions. The strengthened forces have sometimes seemed to
support dictatorial regimes against the wishes of the popu-
lace, though many of them have now been toppled • On the
other hand, the strengthening has not been sufficient to
permit Latin America to furnish armed support in world con-
flicts. Still, the U.S. military programs in Latin America
have improved the foundation on which further betterment
will rest, and it is injudicious to fail to strengthen demo-
cratic governments simply because aid has, in the past,
strengthened authoritarian governments.
Concern over intervention has been a dominant factor
in inter-American relations, ^ven now it makes forceful
action difficult, despite the presence in Cuba of what the
U.3. government, and others, view as a clear threat to the
hemisphere. The 0A3« as the instrument of the governments
that comprise it, can do no more than they decide it shall
do. 3 on the other hand, it cannot carry out decisions if it
lacks appropriate machinery ana strength. Non-intervention
can only be a reality so long as an adequate system of
security is available to all American states. Such security
is based on appropriate armed forces, over which effective
control is exercised.
3, Mecham, pp. 464 -46$.
4. John C. Drier, "Organizing Security In the A ericas,"
American Military Policy , ed. ^d^ar 3. Fumiss, Jr.
(New York? RineEarO: Company, Inc., 1957)* p. 2^4.
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The collective security system is based even more
fundamentally on the ability of the U.S. to continue its
contributions to stability in many parts of the world. Dim-
inution of Latin America's strength would Inevitably impair
that ability on the part of the United States. This would
be a retrogressive effect, because as world tensions increased,
the U.S. would feel it necessary to divert military strength
from other theaters to the hemisphere, especially if some of
the causes of tension arose within the American states.
World conditions and American security seem to argue the
necessity of continuing and developing more fully the U.o.
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